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JUDGED BY THE COMPANY YOU KEEP: AN 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE IDEOLOGIES 
OF JUDGES ON THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS OF APPEALS
Corey Rayburn Yung*
Abstract: Although there has been an explosion of empirical legal schol-
arship about the federal judiciary, with a particular focus on judicial ide-
ology, the question remains: how do we know what the ideology of a judge 
actually is? For federal courts below the U.S. Supreme Court, legal aca-
demics and political scientists have offered only crude proxies to identify 
the ideologies of judges. This Article attempts to cure this deficiency in 
empirical research about the federal courts by introducing a new tech-
nique for measuring the ideology of judges based upon judicial behavior 
in the U.S. courts of appeals. This study measures ideology, not by subjec-
tively coding the ideological direction of case outcomes, but by determin-
ing the degree to which federal appellate judges agree and disagree with 
their liberal and conservative colleagues at both the appellate and district 
court levels. Further, through regression analysis, several important find-
ings related to the Ideology Scores emerge. First, the Ideology Scores in 
this Article offer substantial improvements in predicting civil rights case 
outcomes over the leading measures of ideology. Second, there were very 
different levels and heterogeneity of ideology among the judges on the 
studied circuits. Third, the data did not support the conventional wisdom 
that Presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush appointed uniquely 
ideological judges. Fourth, in general judges appointed by Republican 
presidents were more ideological than those appointed by Democratic 
presidents. Fifth, attendance at a higher-ranked law school was strongly 
correlated with liberalism on the bench for appointments of both Repub-
lican and Democratic presidents. Sixth, prior work experience in the gov-
ernment (outside the judiciary) indicated liberal judicial voting. 
* © 2010, Corey Rayburn Yung, Associate Professor of Law at John Marshall Law 
School. For their helpful comments and suggestions, I would like to thank Joshua Fisch-
man, Judge Richard A. Posner, David L. Schwartz, attendees and co-panelists at the Mid-
west Political Science Association National Conference, and the audience at the Thomas 
Jefferson School of Law Colloquium. For their diligent research, work, and technical sup-
port, I would especially like to thank Robert Breslin, Daniel Calandriello III, Ramsey 
Donnell, Sandra Espisito, Christopher Hack, Miguel Larios, Raizel Liebler, Stephanie Lie-
berman, and James Yung. Lastly, I want to thank John Corkery, Ralph Ruebner, and John 
Marshall Law School, without whose incredible support, this project would not have been 
possible. 
1134 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:1133 
Introduction
 The key front in recent judicial confirmation battles in the Senate 
has been over whether a nominee’s ideology was “radical” or “extreme.”1
On the eve of President Barack Obama’s announcement of his nomina-
tion to replace Justice David Souter on the U.S. Supreme Court, conser-
vative groups branded potential candidates, such as now-Justices Sonia 
Sotomayor and Elena Kagan, and Judge Diane Wood, as having views 
“disturbingly out of the mainstream.”2 Similar charges were made 
against Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito before they 
were confirmed by the Senate.3 After the recent retirement of Justice 
John Paul Stevens, threats of filibusters were made against several of the 
rumored nominees due to questions about ideology.4 For appointments 
to other federal courts, challenges to a nominee’s ideology have been at 
the heart of political confrontations that have slowed the pace of con-
firmations to a crawl.5 Illustrating the absurdity of the political theater 
surrounding the confirmation process, critics contended that Professor 
Goodwin Liu, who was nominated to the Ninth Circuit, was out of the 
political mainstream because Liu had argued that Justice Alito’s ideol-
ogy was “at the margin of the judicial spectrum, not the mainstream.”6
Although ideology has become the focal point of discussions of the fed-
eral judiciary, the question remains as to whether it can be said with any 
confidence what a judge’s ideology actually is. For federal courts below 
the U.S. Supreme Court, legal academics and political scientists have 
offered only crude proxies to identify the ideologies of judges.7
1 See Editorial, Battle for Courts Far From Over, Chattanooga Free Times, June 11, 2005, 
at B7. 
2 Dana Bash, Conservatives Prepare for Supreme Battle, CNN (May 1, 2009), http://www. 
cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/01/gop.scotus/index.html. 
3 See Jeffrey Lord, Conservatives and the Court: Their Moment Is at Hand, Phila. Inquirer, 
Nov. 8, 2005, at A11 (discussing Justice Alito’s nomination to the Supreme Court); Maeve 
Reston, Hearings Likely to Be Dramatic, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Sept. 4, 2005, at A10 
(describing the confirmation hearings of Justice Roberts). 
4 Laura Litvan, GOP Readies for Fight over Stevens’ Successor, Bos. Globe (Apr. 12, 2010), 
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/04/12/gop_readies_for 
_fight_over_stevens_successor/?s_campaign=8315. 
5 See Editorial, Partisan Payback, L.A. Times, Nov. 17, 2009, at A34. 
6 Robert Barnes, Law Professor Goodwin Liu May Be a Test Case for Obama Judicial Picks, 
Wash. Post (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2010/03/21/AR2010032102581.html; see Carol J. Williams, A Big Legal Resume, Getting Bigger; 
Goodwin Liu, 39, May Soon Be the Youngest Judge on 9th Circuit, L.A. Times, Mar. 9, 2010, at A1. 
7 See Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What Is Judicial Ideology, and How Should We 
Measure It?, 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 133, 170 (2009) (“[I]t is obvious that party of ap-
pointment and other proxies can be rather crude measures of ideology.”). 
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 The most commonly-used measure of the ideology of federal 
judges is the political party of the appointing president.8 All appointed 
judges are scored by a binary measure that transfers the political party 
of the appointing president to the judge.9 Notably, it identifies recent 
and current Justices Clarence Thomas, John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day 
O’Connor, Antonin Scalia, Samuel Alito, Harry Blackmun, and David 
Souter as ideological equals because they were appointed by Republi-
can presidents.10 Common Space Scores11 have been hailed as a sub-
stantial improvement over the proxy measure of the appointing presi-
dent because they incorporate the ideologies of the nominee’s home-
state senators with the president’s ideology.12 Yet recent research has 
called into question whether those scores offer any significant measur-
able gains.13
 Justice Sotomayor’s history illustrates one of the oddities of the two 
major proxy measures. When she was nominated by President George 
H.W. Bush to a position on a federal district court, both of the leading 
measures would have labeled her a conservative.14 With subsequent ap-
pointments to a federal appellate court and the Supreme Court, how-
ever, she is now considered a liberal.15 That seeming transformation 
8 See id. at 167–68 (“The most popular proxy for a judge’s ideology, however, has been 
the party of the official who appointed the judge . . . . The appointing-party measure has 
been especially dominant in studies of the federal courts.”); Daniel R. Pinello, Linking 
Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-Analysis, 20 Just. Sys. J. 219, 219 (1999) 
(quoting Gregory N. Flemming et al., An Integrated Model of Privacy Decision Making in State 
Supreme Courts, 26 Am. Pol. Q. 35, 40 (1998)) (“[T]he most common approach . . . has 
been to use the party affiliation of a judge or of the governor who appointed the judge.”). 
9 See Frank B. Cross, Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals 19 (2007) 
(“[R]esearchers have presumed that judges appointed by Democrats are ideologically lib-
eral whereas those appointed by Republicans are ideologically conservative.”). 
10 See id. Each of these seven Justices was appointed by a Republican president, mean-
ing that they were coded as having the same ideology score under the appointing presi-
dent proxy. See id.
11 See Michael W. Giles et al., Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection 
Agendas, 54 Pol. Res. Q. 623, 631 (2001) (calculating a Common Space Score “for the 
state congressional delegation of the President’s party in the year of the judge’s appoint-
ment”). 
12 See id. (labeling Common Space Scores as the “best currently available measure for 
circuit court judicial ideology”). 
13 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 200–01 (“Although there has been much de-
bate about the relative merits of common space scores as opposed to party of appointment 
as measures of judicial ideology[,] . . . performance differences between these two proxy 
measures are quite small in practice. Common space scores provide a better fit to the asy-
lum voting data than party of appointment, but the difference is slight. Both measures 
yield almost identical estimates of the impact of ideology on how judges vote.”). 
14 See Cross, supra note 9, at 19. 
15 See id.
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was not based upon any of her decisions---it was determined solely by 
the politics of President Clinton, President Obama, and the U.S. sena-
tors from New York.16 Had she remained a district court judge, she 
would forever be considered a conservative in academic study. There-
fore, the political party of the appointing president and Common 
Space Scores are essentially useless proxy measures in situations such as 
confirmation battles because the measures gauge judges with the same 
nominating president and from the same state as ideologically identi-
cal, regardless of their judicial track records.17
  Only recently have studies begun to develop comprehensive 
measures of ideology based upon actual judicial performance.18 Yet 
such efforts have not yet extended beyond the Supreme Court.19 Con-
sequently, although there has been a veritable explosion of empirical 
research about federal judges,20 with a particular focus on judicial ide-
ology,21 the most commonly used research measures have been of ques-
tionable efficacy in gauging individual judges.22
16 See id. 
17 See id. 
18 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 162–66. 
19 See Cross, supra note 9, at 16–17. 
20 A particularly helpful resource for such research is Volume 58, Issue 7 of the Duke 
Law Journal, a special symposium issue on “Measuring Judges and Justice.” See, e.g., Jeffrey 
M. Chemerinsky & Jonathan L. Williams, Measuring Judges and Justice, 58 Duke L.J. 1173, 
1174 (2009) (“Empirical scholars have begun to train these same tools on the judiciary. 
They have studied topics ranging from the economic effects of judicial systems to the in-
fluence of ideology on judicial decisionmaking.”); Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, 
Judging the Judges, 58 Duke L.J. 1383, 1384 (2009) (“The rigorous comparative evaluation 
of federal judges has become a popular topic in academic research . . . .”); Jack Knight, Are 
Empiricists Asking the Right Questions About Judicial Decisionmaking?, 58 Duke L.J. 1531, 1535 
(2009) (“Social scientists who study the courts employ an impressive array of statistical and 
mathematical approaches. This array has grown in variety and sophistication in the last 
decade.”); Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Moment and the Qualitative Opportunity: Legal 
Studies of Judicial Decision Making, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 873, 874 (2008) (“In the past decade, 
the pace of empirical legal study has quickened, and the publication of empirical studies 
in law journals has increased. Within just a few short years, empirical study of the law in 
general, and in particular of the courts, has risen to a level of prominence in American law 
schools.”). 
21 See, e.g., Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, Taking the Measure of Ideology: Empirically Measuring 
Supreme Court Cases, 98 Geo. L.J. 1, 2 (2009) (“A central part of empirical judicial inquiries 
has been the legal realist and attitudinalist contribution that shows that in most areas of the 
law, judicial ideology is a significant factor in determining case outcomes.”); Gregory C. Sisk 
& Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic Debates About Statistical Measures, 99 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 743, 744 (2005) (“[T]he seclusion of the ivory tower has been breached, as 
public attention has become increasingly focused upon studies that suggest the influence of 
ideological and partisan variables on the outcome of court cases.”). 
22 See Cross, supra note 9, at 19; Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 201–02. 
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 This Article attempts to cure this deficiency in empirical research 
about the federal courts by introducing a new technique for measuring 
the ideology of judges based upon judicial behavior in the U.S. courts 
of appeals. Although the actions of the Supreme Court attract greater 
attention,23 studying the courts of appeals is significantly more reveal-
ing concerning judicial decision making and the changes in federal 
law.24 Professors Frank Cross and Stefanie Lindquist recently called for 
increased research of the courts of appeals by noting that “the circuit 
court judiciary is probably the single most important level of the fed-
eral judiciary in light of its extensive caseload and policy making au-
thority.”25 Further, in an era where it is almost mandatory to first serve 
on a Court of Appeals before becoming a Supreme Court justice, as was 
the case with every justice currently on the Court except Justice Elena 
Kagan, focusing on the appellate level of the federal judiciary can yield 
important objective information for the nomination process.26
 The three major difficulties in measuring the ideology of federal 
judges below the Supreme Court have been: (1) the enormous number 
of opinions issued by such courts; (2) the inability to accurately code 
the ideological direction of case outcomes in numerous areas of law; 
and (3) the high percentage of unanimous decisions at the federal ap-
pellate level (which ordinarily defeats efforts to construct a valid base-
line for determining ideological differences).27 The measure advocated 
herein addresses the first two problems by using “agnostic” measuring 
23 See Ashlyn K. Kuersten & Donald R. Songer, Decisions on the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals 1 (2001) (“The Courts of Appeals are virtually invisible to most Americans . . . . 
They receive little media coverage because their decisions are often less dramatic than the 
pronouncements of the Supreme Court . . . .”). 
24 See Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That Attempt 
to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 Duke L.J. 1895, 1904 (2009) 
(explaining that among the federal courts, the courts of appeals are better to study be-
cause “[t]he courts of appeals also hear far more cases each year than does the Supreme 
Court, have only very limited control over their dockets, and normally sit in panels of 
three (not en banc)”). 
25 Cross & Lindquist, supra note 20, at 1385; see also David Klein, Making Law in the 
United States Courts of Appeals 4 (2002) (“The truth, well known but often over-
looked in the media and even in serious scholarship, is that lower court judges play a ma-
jor role in the development of legal doctrine.”); Cross, supra note 9, at 1–2 (“[T]he circuit 
courts are much more important [than the U.S. Supreme Court] in setting and enforcing 
the law of the United States.”). 
26 See Timothy P. O’Neill, “The Stepford Justices”: The Need for Experiential Diversity on the 
Roberts Court, 60 Okla. L. Rev. 701, 702 (2007) (“For the first time in history every justice 
had been a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals at the time of appointment to the Supreme 
Court.”). 
27 See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 24, at 1904; Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 
165. 
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techniques that do not code the ideological direction of individual case 
outcomes, but instead look at which judges most often vote together.28
By identifying voting blocs, assessments can be made about the ideolo-
gies of the judges that form those blocs.29 Normally, the third prob-
lem—that all but a small percentage of federal appellate judgments are 
made without a dissenting opinion—makes such agnostic measures use-
less in such situations.30 This is because existing agnostic measures can-
not infer ideology when a panel of judges is in agreement.31 This prob-
lem is largely eliminated in this study, which treats district judges as 
hidden fourth members of federal appellate panels. This allows for the 
incorporation of affirmances and reversals into the ideological measure 
even when the appellate panel issued a unanimous opinion. 
 This study measures ideology by determining the degree to which 
federal appellate judges agree and disagree with their liberal and con-
servative colleagues at both the appellate and district court levels. 
Those agreements are indicative in the aggregate of a judge’s ideology 
on the bench. Further, as part of this unique multi-court-level measure, 
important inter-court factors such as standard of review are incorpo-
rated. Not only does this measure integrate review of lower courts, an 
essential function of the federal judiciary, it also allows for very large 
sample sizes for individual judges. The metric proposed and applied 
herein (the “Ideology Score”) is based upon opinions derived from or 
leading to over 30,000 judicial votes issued in 2008 by eleven courts of 
appeals contained in a unique data set utilized in this study. This Article 
focuses on 177 appellate-level judges who had an adequate number of 
interactions with other judges to yield valid inferences. The Article then 
tests the Ideology Scores against the existing proxy measures to deter-
mine which method is superior at predicting judicial votes. Further, this 
Article examines the connections between judicial ideology and politi-
cal, social, and demographic characteristics of federal judges by utiliz-
ing the newly-proposed measure in a regression analysis. 
 Based upon the measure outlined in this Article, several important 
findings emerge. First, the Ideology Scores in this Article offer substan-
tial improvements in predicting civil rights case outcomes over leading 
28 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 156–57. “Agnostic” is a term used by Professors 
Joshua Fischman and David Law to describe measures that use voting blocs as a means to 
infer judicial ideology. See id. As the term effectively captures the concept, this Article 
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measures of ideology.32 Second, there were very different levels and het-
erogeneity of ideology among the judges on the studied circuits.33
Third, the data did not support the conventional wisdom that Presidents 
Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush appointed uniquely ideological 
judges.34 Fourth, in general judges appointed by Republican presidents 
were more ideological than those appointed by Democratic presidents.35
Fifth, attendance at a higher-ranked law school was strongly correlated 
with liberalism on the bench for appointments of both Republican and 
Democratic presidents.36 Sixth, prior work experience in the govern-
ment (outside of the judiciary) indicated liberal judicial voting. 
 This Article is divided into four parts. Part I discusses the meaning 
of “judicial ideology” and the current methods for measuring the con-
cept.37 Part II introduces the measure used herein, outlines the study 
design and methodology, and discusses the advantages associated with 
the new measure.38 Part III applies the measure to a newly created data 
set of 2008 opinions by eleven U.S. courts of appeals and analyzes the 
results based upon that application.39 Part IV considers the statistical 
reliability, validity, and limitations of the study.40 The Article finishes 
with some concluding thoughts about judicial ideology and new direc-
tions for research. Consistent with the mission of making empirical le-
gal studies more accessible and understandable to a larger audience, 
this Article avoids empirical research jargon whenever possible and util-
izes graphical representation41 of key measures throughout the Arti-
cle.42 Technical details traditionally found in empirical legal studies are 
32 See infra notes 288–314 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra notes 269–279 and accompanying text. 
34 See infra notes 266–268 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 266–268 and accompanying text. 
36 See infra notes 280–281 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra notes 43–166 and accompanying text. 
38 See infra notes 167–248 and accompanying text. 
39 See infra notes 249–281 and accompanying text. 
40 See infra notes 282–359 and accompanying text. 
41 See Lee Epstein et al., On the Effective Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part 
II, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 801, 804–05 (2007) (“[R]esearchers should almost always graph their 
data and results. . . . Unless the author has a very compelling reason to provide precise num-
bers to readers, a well-designed graph is a superior choice to a table.”). 
42 See Lee Epstein et al., On the Effective Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, 
Part I, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1811, 1814 (2006) (“Most crucially, it seems nearly incontrovertible 
that moving towards more appropriate and accessible presentations of data will heighten 
the impact of empirical legal scholarship on its intended audience—be that audience 
other academics, students, policy makers, lawyers, or judges—not to mention raise the 
level of intellectual discourse among scholars themselves.”); Fischman & Law, supra note 7, 
at 135–36 (“The fact that much of the audience is not methodologically sophisticated 
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largely located in the footnotes throughout and appendixes at the end 
of this Article. 
I. What Is “Judicial Ideology” and How Can It Be Measured?
 Because it is contained in the recesses of a human mind, the ideol-
ogy of a judge is not directly observable.43 Ideology is a “latent trait” that 
can only be empirically studied through surrogate measures.44 Which 
proxies a researcher uses can yield very different results and infer-
ences.45 For example, if a researcher sought to measure a judge’s ideol-
ogy based upon how a judge voted in presidential elections (if such in-
formation were available), that might create a very different result than 
if that researcher looked at how a judge voted in panel decisions con-
cerning intellectual property issues.46 The choice of proxies is largely 
based upon implicit and explicit assumptions by a scholar about what 
“judicial ideology” is.47 As a result, there are important definitional con-
siderations that anyone researching judicial ideology should address.48
A. Defining and Measuring Judicial Ideology
 Although “ideology” might seem like a concept that everyone un-
derstands, it can be difficult to pin down with precision.49 Notably, in 
theoretical and empirical discussions of judicial ideology, scholars have 
rarely defined exactly what they meant when they studied the con-
cept.50 At its core, “judicial ideology” is a set of political beliefs held by a 
judge.51 Nevertheless, that broad definition does not identify which be-
liefs are truly ideological or how they should be measured.52
makes it all the more crucial that we do so. As a research community, we must cultivate and 
convey a better understanding of methods for measuring judicial ideology if we are to 
succeed in convincing others of the validity of our work.”). 
43 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 143–44. 
44 See id.
45 See id. at 166–67. 
46 See Matthew Sag et al., Ideology and Exceptionalism in Intellectual Property: An Empirical 
Study, 97 Cal. L. Rev. 801, 847 (2009). Although intellectual property might seem rife with 
apolitical questions, a recent study demonstrated that ideology predicts a great number of 
judicial decisions in such cases. See id.
47 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 137–39. 
48 See id.
49 See id. at 135. 
50 See id. (“Empirical studies routinely purport to measure ideology without specifying 
what is meant by ‘ideology . . . .’”). 
51 See id. at 137 (“An ideology is, in a literal sense, a collection or system of ideas.”). 
52 See id. at 137–38. 
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 Thus far, the primary scholarly impetus for measuring judicial ide-
ology has been to determine the degree to which ideology affects deci-
sion making.53 That task illustrates why the broad definition has not 
generally sufficed.54 There has been considerable debate among schol-
ars and judges concerning the subject of ideological voting by judges.55
On one side have been the strong “attitudinalists” who have contended 
that ideology is the core determining factor in judicial decision mak-
ing.56 In contrast, some scholars and judges, such as Judge Harry T. 
Edwards,57 have argued that formalist interpretation of law, and not 
ideology, resolves the large majority of legal disputes.58 Others, such as 
Judge Richard Posner, have argued that strategic, institutional goals 
(such as career or reputational advancement) offer the best explana-
tion for judicial behavior.59 The broad definition of ideology does not 
yield measures to resolve these disputes because it lacks any content 
describing legal, ideological, and strategic decisions. Consequently, 
each side of the judicial decision-making debate can argue that the re-
53 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 138. 
54 See id.
55 See id. at 135 (“Without seeking to deny that ideology plays a significant role in judi-
cial decision-making, well-informed observers have nevertheless raised reasonable criti-
cisms about the manner in which empirical scholars have tackled the subject . . . . Empiri-
cal studies routinely purport to measure ideology without specifying what is meant by 
‘ideology,’ or taking care to measure ‘ideology’ in a way that will not invite a host of objec-
tions.”). 
56 See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitu-
dinal Model 56 (1993) (“This [attitudinal] model holds that the Supreme Court decides 
disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the 
justices.”). 
57 See Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 Va. L. Rev. 
1335, 1336 (1998); Edwards & Livermore, supra note 24, at 1904–05; Harry T. Edwards, 
Public Misperceptions Concerning the “Politics” of Judging: Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. 
Circuit, 56 U. Colo. L. Rev. 619, 625 (1985); Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on 
Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1639, 1656 (2003) [hereinafter Edwards, The 
Effects of Collegiality]. 
58 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 133 (“There remains deep skepticism in legal 
circles toward interdisciplinary empirical scholarship aimed at capturing the impact of 
ideology on judicial behavior.”). 
59 See Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 29 (2008) (“The strategic theory of ju-
dicial behavior (also called the positive political theory of law) . . . hypothesizes that judges 
do not always vote as they would if they did not have to worry about the reactions to their 
votes of other judges (whether their colleagues or the judges of a higher or a lower court), 
legislators, and the public.”). 
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sults derived from the broad definition fit with its preferred hypothe-
sis.60
 Because of the general inadequacy of the simplistic meaning of 
ideology, scholars have sometimes used “judicial ideology” in a similar 
manner, but at other times, have employed the term in significantly 
different ways.61 A common conception of ideology is that it is synony-
mous with politics and antithetical to law.62 What that means in empiri-
cal research, however, is ambiguous. If a judge is liberal, does that mean 
he or she favors particular parties in legal cases, such as criminal de-
fendants or ethnic minorities?63 Or does it mean that the judge utilizes 
an interpretative methodology that is not concerned with the historical 
understanding of the legal provisions being reviewed?64 Or is a liberal 
judge focused on achieving certain policy ends such as equality, greater 
regulation of corporations, and access to government services?65
 Although it might seem that all of those possibilities characterize 
the ideology of a liberal judge, each indicates a preference for very dif-
ferent ways of measuring the concept. For example, if the emphasis of 
research is on favored or disfavored types of parties (e.g., criminal de-
fendants), the researcher would be concerned with the prevailing par-
ties before the judges.66 If the interpretative method is the touchstone 
of liberalism, however, the reasoning of the opinion will be the focus of 
coding.67 If the scholar believes that a set of policy goals defines what 
liberalism is for a judge, some combination of the prevailing party and 
the reasoning of the opinion will have to be analyzed within a larger 
60 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 147 (“The ongoing debate over the relative 
merits of the legal, attitudinal, and strategic models persists in part because the behavior 
that we observe can often be explained in more than one way.”). 
61 See id. at 137 (“Scholars have used the term ‘ideology’ in a bewildering variety of 
ways, often without even attempting to define it. The result is that ideology is in the eye of 
the beholder: what one observer might call ideological behavior, another might call prin-
cipled judging, and vice versa.”). 




66 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 141–42 (“Alternatively, the term ‘ideological’ 
could describe a tendency to favor or disfavor certain types of parties---criminal defen-
dants, police officers, corporations, members of ethnic or religious minorities, the dis-
abled, and so forth.”). 
67 See id. (“To say that a certain type of judicial behavior is ‘ideological’ need not mean 
that it is ideological in a political sense: one might, for example, characterize adjudication 
that relies heavily upon logical deduction from formal rules as narrowly ‘legal,’ whereas 
adjudication driven by ideas about the role of law and the responsibilities of judges might 
by contrast be characterized as both ‘legal’ and ‘ideological’ in character.”). 
2010] Empirical Study of the Ideologies of Judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals 1143 
social context.68 Further, although the focus on parties, for example, in 
criminal cases would yield a robust data set, a researcher concerned 
with policy goals might discount an inordinate number of the cases as 
being irrelevant to the articulated liberal goals.69 The nature of the 
measure and the way data is collected are dictated by the definition 
adopted or implied by the empirical researcher.70
 Rather than engaging in the highly subjective and problematic 
determination of the meaning of ideology and the proper measure-
ment to determine its effects, this Article takes a different approach.
Instead of focusing on identifying which decisions were ideological and 
then determining the aggregate degree to which ideology drove a 
judge’s vote, this Article accepts as a basic premise that at least some 
body of decisions were guided by a judge’s ideology. Even the most ar-
dent supporters of strategic and legal models of decision making ac-
knowledge that a portion of decisions are best explained by ideology.71
Further, this premise is consistent with prior research of the federal ju-
diciary.72 The focus of the measure herein is gauging the judges in the 
aggregate based upon situations when their ideologies surface in their 
voting behavior. This study compares judges to determine which ones 
are more conservative or liberal relative to their colleagues based upon 
whom they most often vote with and against. 
 The result is a set of scores for judges ranging from the most lib-
eral to the most conservative judges serving on the U.S. courts of ap-
peals, but that scale is not tied to some larger objective measure—it is 
68 See id.
69 See id. (“It might be considered ‘ideological,’ for example, for judges to seek to ad-
vance a particular policy outcome . . . .”). 
70 See id. (“It is not possible for this Article to settle the correct meaning of the term 
‘ideology.’ How researchers should or will use the term will inevitably depend upon the 
purposes that they have in mind.”). 
71 See, e.g., Edwards & Livermore, supra note 24, at 1899 (“Because it is undisputed that 
some cases admit of discretion in the exercise of appellate decisionmaking, scholars and 
commentators sometimes contend that judges must be influenced in their decisionmaking 
by their personal political or ideological predilections. This may happen at times.”); Sisk & 
Heise, supra note 21, at 752–53 (“The real debate . . . was not whether ideology or extra-
legal factors matter in judging, but how much, how often, in what instances, and whether 
they substantially undermine the proper functioning of the judiciary.”). 
72 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 Cal. L. 
Rev. 1457, 1479–82 (2003) (reviewing the empirical evidence in support of ideological 
decision making in federal courts below the U.S. Supreme Court); Sisk & Heise, supra note 
21, at 746 (“The growing body of empirical research on the lower federal courts . . . reveals 
that ideology explains only a relatively modest part of judicial behavior and emerges on 
the margins in controversial and ideologically contested cases.”). 
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entirely relative.73 Because of the nature of the measure used in this 
study, the definitional problems are less significant than in other em-
pirical work.74 This Article uses the broad definition described above 
because there is no need to outline the actual content of any judge’s 
ideology. As will be further explained in Part II, by making prior as-
sessments of particular judges being liberal and conservative, there is 
no need to describe the particulars of their belief systems.75 It is merely 
enough to measure the degree to which the studied judges agree or 
disagree with their liberal and conservative colleagues. 
B. Measures of the Judicial Ideology of Federal Judges
 There have been many attempts by legal academics and political 
scientists to gauge the ideology of individual judges at different levels of 
the judiciary.76 Because of the available resources, most of these studies 
have focused on justices of the United States Supreme Court.77 Certain 
techniques have worked very well in studying the highest court; how-
ever, they are not as useful in analyzing other courts.78 Although the 
measures of ideology can be categorized in a variety of manners, per-
haps the easiest way to appreciate the real differences in techniques is 
to consider three major approaches: case outcome coding, external 
proxies, and agnostic measures. 
1. Measuring Judicial Ideology Through Case Outcome Coding 
 Using case outcomes to determine judicial ideology requires schol-
ars to assess a judge’s votes or opinions based upon the ideological di-
rection of the decisions the judge has made.79 Cases are typically coded 
using a binary construction where a particular case outcome is either 
entirely “liberal” or “conservative.”80 Based upon a judge’s votes or opin-
73 The scale is limited to judges with sufficient sample sizes to create valid statistical in-
ferences. See infra notes 190–191 and accompanying text. 
74 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 138. 
75 See infra notes 243–248 and accompanying text. 
76 See, e.g., Klein, supra note 25, at 4; Cross & Lindquist, supra note 20, at 1385. 
77 See, e.g., Segal & Spaeth, supra note 56, at xv; Jacobi & Sag, supra note 21, at 4. 
78 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 152. 
79 See id. at 156–62. 
80 See id. at 156 (“Most empirical studies on the subject of judicial ideology rely on 
some sort of dichotomous coding scheme, in which observable judicial actions---typically a 
vote or decision of some kind---are coded as ‘zero’ or ‘one,’ depending on whether they 
are, in some rough sense, ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative.’”); Jacobi & Sag, supra note 21, at 6–7 
(“The primary form of categorization is fairly basic . . . . The standard means for categoriz-
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ions in a sufficient sample of cases, a judge’s ideology can be identi-
fied.81 There is intuitive appeal to this methodology because it is how a 
lay audience, believing that the labels “conservative” and “liberal” are 
easily applied to particular decisions, would presumably assess a judge.82
 Because of the enormous work effort required for such a project, 
scholars using case outcome methodologies have primarily relied upon 
two pre-existing data sets.83 For studies of the Supreme Court, scholars 
have typically utilized Harold Spaeth’s United States Supreme Court 
Judicial Database (the “Spaeth Database”).84 For the U.S. courts of ap-
peals, the Appeals Court Database (the “Songer Database”), which in-
cludes more than 18,000 opinions from 1925 to 1996,85 has become the 
data set of choice.86 There is no similar database for federal district 
courts, and research at that level has been extremely limited.87 The 
Spaeth Database is comprehensive in regards to opinions issued by the 
Court, so it should not be surprising that most of the empirical re-
search of judicial ideology has been focused on the Supreme Court.88
Because the Songer Database covers such a lengthy time period with 
limited sampling, however, it is virtually impossible to make valid ideol-
ogy assessments of individual judges from this source. Even studies that 
have focused on discrete courts and issues, such as the examination of 
administrative deference in the D.C. Circuit by Professors Emerson 
Tiller and Frank Cross, or Professor Richard Revesz’s examination of 
environmental decisions in the D.C. Circuit, have not provided individ-
ual judge ideology measures.89 Overall, in the federal courts below the 
ing case outcomes is to use Spaeth’s United States Supreme Court Judicial Database . . . 
coding, which categorizes cases as ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative.’”). 
81 See Jacobi & Sag, supra note 21, at 7. 
82 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 163. 
83 See Kuersten & Songer, supra note 23, at 241; Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 161. 
84 See Jacobi & Sag, supra note 21, at 8; Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court Data-
base (last updated Aug. 26, 2010), http://supremecourtdatabase.org. 
85 Kuersten & Songer, supra note 23, at 241; Donald R. Songer, Appeals Court Da-
tabase, http://people.cas.sc.edu/songer/ (follow hyperlinks next to “Appeals Court Da-
tabase”) (last visited Aug. 10, 2010). 
86 See Cross, supra note 72, at 1498. 
87 See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 24, at 1899–1900. 
88 See Kuersten & Songer, supra note 23, at 241. 
89 See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal 
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 Yale L.J. 2155, 2173 (1998); 
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulations, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 Va. L. Rev. 
1717, 1763–64 (1997). David Law’s asylum study, however, allowed for individual assess-
ments in the Ninth Circuit. David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, 
and Asylum Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 817, 860 (2005). 
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Supreme Court, there has been no comprehensive measure of individ-
ual judge ideology using case outcome coding.90
 Case outcome coding is susceptible to two unique problems.91 First, 
it is extremely labor-intensive because every case, even ones with contra-
dictory or indeterminate indicators, must be coded by ideology.92 This 
burden is particularly high if a scholar wants to make individual assess-
ments of a large number of judges, because a sufficient sample will be 
required for each judge.93 When data set creation is too difficult for a 
researcher, he or she is usually forced to shrink the breadth of the data 
set.94 Limiting the scope of the data set can diminish the inferences that 
can be drawn from a study as well as increase standard errors.95
 Second, case outcome coding relies on subjective coding that is 
often imprecise.96 As Professors Tonja Jacobi and Matthew Sag recently 
observed, “[T]he last four decades of empirical scholarship have pro-
ceeded without a sophisticated objective measure of case outcomes.”97
Because of its high profile, the Spaeth Database has been targeted by 
critics because of the problems of subjective and imprecise coding.98
Professor Anna Harvey compared the ideology coding decisions made 
in the Spaeth Database with the roll call voting in Congress when fed-
eral legislation was reviewed.99 Her results indicated little correlation 
between the ideology of the congressional votes and the Spaeth Data-
base coding.100 Judge Richard Posner and Professor William Landes 
examined both the Spaeth Database and Songer Database for ideologi-
cal coding and found numerous discrepancies between their coding 
and that contained in the databases.101 Further, because case coding 
relies upon a wholly binary construction of the concept, it lacks signifi-




94 See id. at 157–58. 
95 See Robert M. Lawless et al., Empirical Methods in Law 425 (2010) (defining a 
standard error as “an estimate of the error between a sample statistic and the true value in 
the population”); Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 157–58. 
96 See Jacobi & Sag, supra note 21, at 7. 
97 Id.
98 See Carolyn Shapiro, Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical Analysis of the Su-
preme Court, 60 Hastings L.J. 477, 488–500 (2009). 
99 See Anna Harvey, What Makes a Judgment “Liberal”? Coding Bias in the United 
States Supreme Court Judicial Database 17 ( June 15, 2008) (unnumbered working paper), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120970. 
100 See id. at 19. 
101 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical 
Study, 1 J. Legal Analysis 775, 784 (2009). 
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cant nuance in particular cases.102 For example, because of its simplistic 
design, a vote for striking down a restriction on access to abortion is 
coded as having the same ideology and importance as a plaintiff victory 
in a securities derivative suit.103
2. Measuring Judicial Ideology Through External Proxies 
 External proxy metrics determine judicial ideology based upon 
responses to judges’ work by others, without analyzing the content of 
the opinions of those judges.104 The external audience can be com-
posed of other judges, legislators, agencies, the media, or members of 
the general public.105 The reception of a judge’s decisions can give in-
sight into the judge’s incentives as well as reasoning.106 Nonetheless, 
external proxy metrics, by their very nature, do not directly measure 
the qualities contained within the judicial opinions issued.107
 Outside of ideology studies, the most notorious recent example of 
the use of external proxy measures was the “tournament of judges” 
model created by Professors Stephen Choi and G. Mitu Gulati.108 That 
study evaluated judges on the U.S. courts of appeals based upon, 
among other measures, two external proxy metrics: citations to opin-
ions of particular judges, and the frequency with which a judge reached 
a different judgment than members of his or her party on the same 
panel.109 Similarly, Professors Jeffrey Berger and Tracey George com-
pleted a study of judicial entrepreneurs at the federal appellate level 
102 See Jacobi & Sag, supra note 21, at 6 (“Due to this unreliability, scholars more com-
monly rely on objective, but highly simplified, means of categorizing or labeling cases. 
These categories are typically dichotomous—for example, a case is either pro-plaintiff or 
pro-defendant—and thus do not provide as meaningful a form of measurement as a con-
tinuous variable would. A continuous measure—one that permits infinite variation along a 
scale—would allow cases to be judged accurately by comparing the score with a substan-
tive, comparative assessment of similar cases.”). 
103 See id.
104 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 166–76. 
105 See Posner, supra note 59, at 29. 
106 See id.
107 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 166–67. 
108 See Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, Essay, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 299, 
305–13 (2004) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, Tournament]; Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, 
Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. Cal. 
L. Rev. 23, 33–34 (2004); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Mr. Justice Posner? Unpacking the 
Statistics, 61 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 19, 29 (2005). 
109 Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 108, at 305–13. 
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that focused on citations of judges by the Supreme Court.110 Professors 
David Klein and Darby Morrisroe measured prestige of federal appel-
late judges through the external metric of citations by other judges.111
In a subsequent study, Klein incorporated the metric of whether a 
judge established a new rule that was followed by later courts.112 Profes-
sors Frank Cross and Stefanie Lindquist have recently published a study 
that focused on reversal rates upon appeal to the Supreme Court.113
 In the context of judicial ideology, external proxies have been 
the most popular method of assessing the political beliefs of particu-
lar judges.114 Indeed, the most common measure used for the ideol-
ogy of federal judges by scholars has been the external proxy of the 
political party of the appointing president.115 Although research has 
shown that the party of the appointing president has a statistically sig-
nificant effect on the decisions of judges on the U.S. courts of appeals 
in some areas of law,116 studies have not found a similar relationship at 
other court levels.117
 Segal-Cover scores and NOMINATE scores have become commonly 
used metrics for judicial ideology in certain circumstances.118 Segal-Cover 
scores apply strictly to Supreme Court justices and are based upon news-
paper editorials from four major newspapers at the time of nomina-
tion.119 Although Segal-Cover scores have been subject to praise120 and 
110 See Jeffrey A. Berger & Tracey E. George, Judicial Entrepreneurs on the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals: A Citation Analysis of Judicial Influence 1, 3 (Vanderbilt U. L. Sch. L. & Econ., Work-
ing Paper No. 05-24, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=789544. 
111 See David E. Klein & Darby Morrisroe, The Prestige and Influence of Individual Judges 
on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28 J. Legal Stud. 371, 379 (1999). 
112 See Klein, supra note 25, at 51. 
113 See Cross & Lindquist, supra note 20, at 1405 (“We do not suggest that the Supreme 
Court review measure is the sole test for circuit court judicial quality or even a ‘gold stan-
dard’ measure. We contend only that it is an important metric that has not been previously 
considered and that may yield insight into the quality of circuit court judges.”). 
114 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 166–67. 
115 See id. at 167–68. 
116 See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary 
Investigation, 90 Va. L. Rev. 301, 303 (2004). 
117 See Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Back-
ground on Case Outcomes, 24 J. Legal Stud. 257, 276 (1995). 
118 See Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic 
History of Roll Call Voting 27–29 (1997) (discussing NOMINATE Scores, which use 
roll-call data from Congress to estimate the ideological ideal points of legislators); Jeffrey 
A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 557, 558 (1989) (calculating Segal-Cover Scores). 
119 Segal & Cover, supra note 118, at 559. 
120 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 184–85. 
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criticism,121 a similar approach at the lower federal courts is simply im-
possible because of the limited, and event-driven coverage of other fed-
eral judges.122
 NOMINATE Scores have been subsequently updated and modified 
into Common Space Scores. Common Space Scores have become in-
creasingly popular as an alternative to the appointing president proxy 
measure.123 Common Space Scores integrate the politics of the appoint-
ing president with the home-state senator(s) of the judicial nominee.124
The metric relies on the notion that senatorial courtesy is an important 
factor in the selection of federal judges.125 Common Space Scores move 
beyond the simple binary construction of the appointing president 
while accounting for a larger political context at the time of a judge’s 
nomination.126 Nonetheless, recent research by Joshua Fischman and 
David Law analyzed the efficacy of Common Space Scores in predicting 
outcomes in Ninth Circuit asylum cases and found only marginal im-
provements over the appointing president measure.127
 As is made clear by the above examples, external proxy scores are 
quite varied; however, they share several shortcomings.128 First, similar 
to case outcome coding, external proxies often rely on either subjective 
coding decisions or imprecise coding.129 In the case of the party of the 
appointing president, ideology is reduced to a binary concept because 
of America’s two-party political system.130 Further, every judge ap-
pointed by a president is treated identically.131 Even presidents with 
very different ideologies would have their nominated judges labeled as 
ideological matches using the appointing president proxy if they were 
of the same political party.132 Thus, the appointing president measure 
fails to acknowledge any gradations along the political spectrum.133 Al-
121 See id.
122 See Kuersten & Songer, supra note 23, at 1. 
123 Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 173. 
124 Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 83–84, 95–96 
(2002). 
125 See Giles, supra note 11, at 634–35. 
126 See id.
127 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 167–68. 
128 See Cross, supra note 9, at 20. 
129 See id; Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 170. 
130 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 170. 
131 See id.
132 See id.
133 See id. at 171 (“Party of appointment can be used to identify aggregate differences 
between appointees of the two parties, but it cannot distinguish between moderate and 
extreme judges.”). 
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though adding the politics of the senators into the judges’ ideologies 
creates greater variation in scoring, it is unclear if such distinctions ac-
tually reflect the ideologies of those judges more accurately than the 
party of the appointing president alone.134 Further, although the 
Common Space Scores create a greater range of scores, the appointing 
president’s political party still entirely controls whether a judge is on 
the liberal or conservative half of the spectrum.135
 Second, because an external metric relies on responses by other 
parties, the metric is only as good as those other parties.136 So, for ex-
ample, if the U.S. Supreme Court were less competent than the lower 
appellate courts at analyzing certain legal issues,137 a measure of judicial 
quality based upon Supreme Court reversals would actually be inversely 
related to quality.138 Similarly, if judges cited other judges’ opinions 
based solely upon reputation, personal relations, or showiness in opin-
ion writing, then the citations would fail to effectively demonstrate qual-
ity.139 Further, feedback loops can develop that exacerbate those effects 
to a larger extent over time.140 In the context of ideology studies, Segal-
Cover scores are particularly susceptible to this criticism because they 
rely on editorial writers who may be driven by partisan goals or who lack 
any real insight into the targets of their writing.141 Common Space 
134 See id. at 167–68. 
135 See id.
136 See Cross & Lindquist, supra note 20, at 1400–03. 
137 See David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction 
Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 223, 265–66 (2008). Although there is a 
general assumption that higher courts are more competent, such a proposition has not 
been empirically supported. See id. In a different area of federal law, Schwartz argued that 
because federal district courts do not lower their reversal rates in patent claim construc-
tion cases, the problem might be that the Federal Circuit has repeatedly made a mess of 
the relevant controlling law. See id. (“Alternatively, the problem may stem from potential 
inconsistencies in the Federal Circuit’s methodology or ideology. If such inconsistencies 
exist, then they prevent parties from predicting accurate claim constructions prior to ap-
pellate review.”). 
138 See Cross & Lindquist, supra note 20, at 1403. Cross and Lindquist contend that 
“this criticism inevitably undermines every attempt to measure judicial quality and thus is 
not dispositive.” Id.
139 See Daniel A. Farber, Supreme Court Selection and Measures of Past Judicial Performance, 
32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1175, 1178–79 (2005) (discussing factors that influence how often a 
judge’s opinions are cited, including the author’s reputation, personal relationships be-
tween judges, and some degree of luck); Kate O’Neill, Rhetoric Counts: What We Should Teach 
When We Teach Posner, 39 Seton Hall L. Rev. 507, 507–09 (2009) (finding a connection 
between Judge Posner’s opinions and the stylistic nature of case book citations). 
140 See Farber, supra note 139, at 1177. 
141 See Lee Epstein & Carol Mershon, Measuring Political Preferences, 40 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 
261, 281–84 (1996).
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Scores similarly rely on a senatorial courtesy norm that might not be 
used regularly by certain presidents or in specific situations.142
 Third, the leading proxy measures all rely on factors at the time of 
nomination instead of the behavior of judges after their appoint-
ment.143 This means that the ratings are forever trapped in time and do 
not account for changing circumstances.144 If a judge turns out to have 
a different ideology than expected (e.g., Justice Souter), the external 
proxies treat the judge as though the expectations were met.145 Further, 
if a judge changes ideology over time (e.g., Justice Blackmun), the 
measures do not recognize the change.146
3. Measuring Judicial Ideology Through Agnostic Measures 
 Agnostic measures identify voting blocs in a large number of cases 
to determine which judges are most often aligned.147 Thus, agnostic 
measures do not rely on the coding of particular cases on subjective 
criteria or on factors external to the judiciary.148 If a judge more often 
votes with liberals and against conservatives, then an agnostic measure-
based study would conclude that the judge is liberal.149 The rate of 
agreements and disagreements determines the intensity of that ideol-
ogy. 
 Notably, in order for an agnostic measure to work effectively, the 
researcher must be able to make some prior assessments of particular 
judges that embody the qualities studied.150 For example, if a scholar 
wanted to determine whether persons who wore the same color shirts 
were more inclined to sit near each other in class, the scholar would 
need to have prior assessments of what shirts in the class constituted 
red, blue, or green. In the context of judicial ideology studies, there 
must be some ability to identify who are some conservative and liberal 
142 See Giles, supra note 11, at 628. 
143 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 173. 
144 See id.
145 See Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How 
Important?, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1483, 1519–26 (2007) (finding an ideological drift among U.S. 
Supreme Court justices over time). 
146 See id.
147 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 162–66. 
148 See id. at 162. 
149 See id.
150 See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 Pol. Analysis 134, 139–40 
(2002). 
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judges.151 The judge need not be liberal or conservative all of the time, 
nor the most liberal or conservative judge.152 It is simply enough to be 
confident that a significant portion of the identified judges belong on 
either half of the political spectrum.153
 Of the existing ideology measures, the leading one applied to the 
Supreme Court is agnostic: Martin-Quinn scores.154 Professors Andrew 
Martin and Kevin Quinn constructed a model whereby voting align-
ments of justices in non-unanimous opinions since 1953 served as the 
basis for ideology scores.155 They then used a simulation technique 
known as Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation to provide a probabil-
ity distribution of each of the justices’ ideological ideal points.156 As de-
tailed in Part II, this Article utilizes a method akin to the Martin-Quinn 
scores, but does not use Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods due to 
software limitations and inconsistencies with the nature of appellate 
and trial court interactions.157
 As currently constructed, agnostic measures have two unique disad-
vantages.158 First, such measures exhibit data set breadth problems be-
cause neither unanimous panel opinions nor opinions made outside of 
a panel structure (e.g., those at the federal district court level) can be 






156 See Martin & Quinn, supra note 150, at 139–40. 
157 See id. There were four reasons that this Article did not use Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo methods. First, the software utilized by Martin and Quinn, MCMCpack only allows 
for data to be entered as zeroes, ones, and blanks. See id. at 141. Although that works well 
for the Supreme Court, this model requires opinions to be weighted on a continuous 
scale. Second, the Markov Chain Monte Carlo method, as currently constructed, does not 
utilize unanimous opinions. See id. at 137 n.3. One of the substantial improvements offered 
by the model used herein is to add those cases into the model. The first two problems, 
along with a few other problems, afflict the other leading Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
methods software, WinBUGS. See Law, supra note 89, at 857 n.127. Third, unlike the Su-
preme Court, just three or four (if the district court judge is included) judges review a case 
at a given time. See Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality, supra note 57, at 1656. This makes the 
points of interaction among the judges occur with far less frequency. See id. This results in 
significant difficulties in achieving convergence, which is a necessary part of the Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo methods. Fourth, one of the primary reasons for using such a model—
the ability to deal with small samples using Bayesian statistical techniques—was not a par-
ticular concern in this study because of the size of the data set. See Martin & Quinn, supra
note 150, at 135. 
158 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 165; Martin & Quinn, supra note 150, at 139–40. 
159 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 165; Martin & Quinn, supra note 150, at 137 n.3. 
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agreement, the researcher cannot determine the ideological direction 
of the decision because the ideology of the case outcome is not coded 
using such a method.160 The agreement of the three judges, thus, can-
not be labeled as an agreement indicative of liberalism or conserva-
tism.161 This problem is even more significant if, as Joshua Fischman has 
found, the courts studied exhibit norms of consensus that mask underly-
ing ideological disagreement.162 Further, trial judges are not part of vot-
ing blocs, so agnostic measures have been useless as to such judges.163
 Second, agnostic measures cannot exist independent of some 
other assessment of ideology.164 Agnostic measures need strong prior 
assumptions about at least some judges who can be characterized as 
liberal or conservative. Without such reliable and valid assumptions, an 
agnostic measure will still yield results, but it will be unclear what has 
been measured.165 In the context of ideology, however, because there is 
fairly wide agreement about some prior assessments concerning judges 
who are liberal and conservative, agnostic measures can overcome this 
potential pitfall.166
II. Measuring Judicial Ideology by Agreement and Disagreement 
Among Federal Judges at Multiple Levels
 The model used herein relies on the idea that like-minded judges 
will vote together more often. If there is enough data concerning 
agreements and disagreements, groups of judges with similar belief sys-
tems can be identified. With some prior assessments of which judges 
are more likely to be conservative or liberal, the belief systems can be 
mapped onto the traditional left-right political spectrum.167 As previ-
ously noted, this model integrates district court voting into the deter-
mination of appellate judge ideology.168
 This measure not only expands ideology measurement beyond the 
U.S. Supreme Court, but it also allows for a substantially more robust 
160 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 165. 
161 See id.
162 See id.; Joshua B. Fischman, Estimating Preferences of Appellate Judges: A Model of “Consen-
sus Voting” 3–4 (Va. Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 2009-14; Va. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, 
Research Paper No. 2009-21, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1361348. 
163 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 165. 
164 See Martin & Quinn, supra note 150, at 139–40. 
165 See id.
166 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 162–63. 
167 See id.
168 See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text; infra notes 189–191 and accompany-
ing text. 
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model that incorporates the full range of decisions made by federal 
judges. There are many aspects of the modern Supreme Court that 
make it a highly atypical court in terms of judicial ideology.169 Primarily, 
because of the ever-shrinking Supreme Court docket, it is a less-than-
ideal institution to study empirically.170 With approximately seventy-five 
cases reviewed a year, the population sizes are very small (particularly 
using existing measures),171 coverage of different areas of law is mini-
mal,172 and the self-selected docket does not necessarily provide a ran-
dom sample of litigation in the United States even while overlooking 
the selection effects of the litigants involved.173 In contrast, the U.S. 
courts of appeals review an enormous number of cases over a wide area 
of law,174 are constrained by the Supreme Court, en banc review, and 
other panel decisions,175 and judges on those courts can be assessed 
based upon performance before being elevated to the Supreme 
169 See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 24, at 1904 (“There are many empirical stud-
ies devoted to the decisions of the Supreme Court. However, because of the Court’s 
unique status and operating procedures, it is difficult to draw broad conclusions about 
decision-making in the federal courts of appeals from studies of the Supreme Court.”). 
170 See Cross, supra note 9, at 2 (“The Supreme Court now decides only seventy-five 
cases a year . . . .”). 
171 See id.
172 See id.; Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, 32 
Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1259, 1273 (2005) (“[T]he Supreme Court reviews only a minute per-
centage . . . of court of appeals decisions. Entire fields of law are left mainly to the courts 
of appeals to shape.”). 
173 See Jonathan Masur, Judicial Deference and the Credibility of Agency Commitments, 60 
Vand. L. Rev. 1021, 1058 n.162 (2007) (“The drawing of conclusions based on this collec-
tion of Supreme Court cases is obviously fraught with peril because the sample is heavily 
influenced by selection effects. Only certain types of cases reach the Supreme Court (or 
are even litigated in the first place), and unquestionably ambiguous and unambiguous 
statutes are likely filtered out at lower levels of the process.”); Richard L. Revesz, Empirical 
Research and the Goals of Legal Scholarship: A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholarship, 69 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 169, 173–74 & n.25 (2002) (“[A]ny empirical technique that does not control for 
case-selection effects is biased against finding evidence consistent with the hypothesis that 
judges vote ideologically.”); Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Positivism, 25 Conn. L. Rev.
797, 824 (1993) (“[G]iven the existing indeterminacy and moral reference of so much of 
the constitutional text, and given the way in which the selection effect concentrates in the 
Supreme Court cases for which the narrowly legal materials do not generate an answer, the 
actual process of constitutional decisionmaking in the Supreme Court of the United States 
is one in which Dworkin is much more right than he is wrong.”). 
174 See Cross, supra note 25, at 2 (“[T]he circuit courts resolve more than fifty thou-
sand cases a year.”). 
175 See Charlie Savage, Uncertain Evidence for “Activist” Label on Sotomayor, N.Y. Times, 
June 20, 2009, at A10 (“Supreme Court justices have a freer hand than appeals court 
judges.”). 
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Court.176 This last aspect of U.S. courts of appeals judges is particularly 
notable given the strong trend to select Supreme Court justices from 
the federal appellate ranks.177
 The value of the agnostic measure used in this study is especially 
clear when comparing it to the alternatives. Whereas ideological case 
outcome coding might not be able to identify, for example, whether a 
particular tort action or contract dispute was resolved in a “liberal” 
manner, agnostic coding should identify trends in the aggregate, inso-
far as conservatives and liberals reach different conclusions in such 
cases.178 If there are no ideological dividing lines in those cases, then 
the agnostic measure would similarly ignore those decisions because 
they were not indicative of judicial ideology.179 Importantly, by adding 
district court votes to the model of appellate court judge ideology, the 
measure is able to harvest data from unanimous appellate panel opin-
ions.180 And, as explained below, information about an appellate 
judge’s ideology is gained even when a unanimous appellate panel af-
firms a district court judgment.181 Also, the measure greatly expands 
the number of comparative references for appellate judges from their 
appellate judge colleagues to all those trial judges beneath them.182
Nevertheless, the utilization of district court data requires significant 
adjustment to a basic agnostic model.183 In addition to those issues, 
there are several other factors that must be included in a valid model of 
ideology of U.S. courts of appeals judges.184 Each of those concerns is 
discussed below.185
A. Data Gathering
 For this study, data was gathered from opinions issued by the First, 
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and 
176 See Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 108, at 303 (“The selection of future Su-
preme Court justices on the basis of such objective criteria would make clear (and thereby 
reduce) the role that politics plays in both the initial process of selecting a candidate and 
the often highly political Senate confirmation proceedings.”). 
177 See id. (“The norm today appears to be that a candidate for the Supreme Court 
must first sit on a federal circuit court of appeals before [he or] she may be considered for 
a seat on the court.”); O’Neill, supra note 26, at 702. 
178 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 162–63. 
179 See id.
180 See id. at 165. 
181 See infra notes 186–243 and accompanying text. 
182 See infra notes 186–191 and accompanying text. 
183 See infra notes 200–242 and accompanying text. 
184 See infra notes 282–314 and accompanying text. 
185 See infra notes 186–314 and accompanying text. 
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Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals in 2008. The resultant data set 
(“Case Database”) from those circuits included 30,726 judicial votes 
from panel decisions. The Case Database included opinions that used a 
standard of review while excluding immigration186 and habeas corpus187
cases due to the unique standard of review issues in such cases.188 In an 
effort to address a substantial defect in the major data sets that have 
been used to empirically study the U.S. courts of appeals, the Case Da-
tabase included unpublished opinions available through electronic da-
tabases.189 The Case Database also included the district court decisions 
underlying the appellate review in every instance where a district court 
judgment was reviewed. 
186 See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction Through the Lens 
of Habeas Corpus, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 459, 474 (2006) (discussing how large portions of 
immigration case review are based upon a collateral review model that affords a very high 
level of deference because “[t]he regulations . . . revise the standard of review to require 
greater deference to an immigration judge’s findings of fact”). 
187 See Brandon Scott, When Child Abuse Becomes Child Homicide: The Case of Gilson v. 
Sirmons, 34 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 281, 293, 305 (2009) (discussing the “unique” standard 
of review in federal habeas cases due to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act). 
188 For each of the courts of appeals databases in LexisNexis, the following search was 
executed, and all of the results were downloaded and coded: “date aft 1/1/2008 and date 
bef 1/1/2009 and (“De Novo” or Clear! Erro! or (Arbitrar! w/3 Capricious!) or (Abus! 
w/3 Discretion) or “Substantial Evidence” or “Standard of Review”) and not immigration 
and not habeas.” 
189 See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 24, at 1923. According to Harry T. Edwards 
and Michael A. Livermore: 
[T]he Songer database does not include unpublished decisions issued by the 
courts of appeals. This is an extremely important omission, because a huge 
percentage of courts of appeals decisions are reported but unpublished. In 
fact, in 2007, less than 17 percent of all opinions in the courts of appeals were 
published. Published decisions as a sample of total decisions are far from 
random: the judgments rendered in unpublished decisions are largely 
unanimous, and these cases typically involve more straightforward applica-
tions of law. Unpublished decisions, no less than published decisions, dispose 
of appeals on the merits. Importantly, unpublished decisions offer valuable 
information regarding a court’s adherence to precedent, because in these 
cases the law is often most clear. Law professors and researchers tend to focus 
on published decisions that raise difficult issues and establish new precedent. 
For the vast majority of litigants, however, it is often of no moment whether a 
case is published or not. The court’s judgment is what matters. And every 
judgment counts when one attempts to accurately measure the work of the 
appellate courts. Therefore, any assessment of the work of the courts of ap-
peals that does not include unpublished decisions cannot be seen as com-
plete. 
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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 Cases were coded for, among other variables: judges; whether indi-
vidual judges were sitting by designation; disposition; type of case (e.g., 
criminal/environmental); prevailing party; circuit; district court judge; 
district court; whether the case involved constitutional review of legisla-
tion; whether the case was reviewing the decision of an executive 
agency; and the standard of review used. In analyzing each case, the 
vote of each judge on the panel was coded separately. This allowed for 
each judge’s ideology to be determined independently, even when he 
or she dissented in a case. 
 In addition to the 2008 database of cases, a separate database 
(“Judge Database”) was constructed that included biographical and 
demographic data about individual judges. In the Judge Database, 
judges were coded for, among other variables: appointing president; 
presidential party; rating by the American Bar Association at the time of 
nomination; age at the time of appointment; age as of 2008; composi-
tion of the Senate at the time of the confirmation vote; gender; race; law 
school attended; prior work experience; whether the president and ma-
jority of the Senate were of the same party at the time of the appoint-
ment; and whether the judge took senior status during or before 2008. 
The Judge Database featured data for all federal appellate judges who 
served on panels and were included in the Case Database, as well as dis-
trict judges who issued opinions reviewed by those appellate courts. 
 This study’s data set included data from 1293 judges who served 
on the U.S. courts of appeals, including judges who sat by designation 
and who served in the federal district courts. Most of those judges, 
however, only issued a few judicial votes. This was particularly true of 
judges who had taken senior status before or during 2008, district court 
judges who sat upon appellate panels by designation, or district court 
judges who only had a limited number of cases reviewed by the appel-
late courts.190 Because the smaller sample sizes of votes by judges might 
offer less valid data, the discussion below often limits the analysis to the 
results from the 177 judges on the U.S. courts of appeals who had a 
significant number of interactions in the range of categories of cases 
studied.191
190 In all, the data set included 2273 judicial votes by judges sitting by designation. 
191 The cutoff was conservatively based upon a relatively even distribution of judges 
with lower vote counts throughout the political spectrum. 
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B. Determining the Ideology Score
 Although the core element of the metric is determining agree-
ments and disagreements, a simple count of such instances is inade-
quate to effectively gauge ideology.192 Judges are not situated in identi-
cal manners.193 Most importantly, they have differing case type mixes, 
review district courts with varied degrees of deference, sit on different 
circuits, and interact with very dissimilar groups of judges.194 As a result, 
the model incorporates each of those differences in an effort to cap-
ture a judge’s ideology by including the context in which his or her ju-
dicial votes were made. 
1. Adjusting for Case Mixes 
 Because each circuit is defined based upon geography, every cir-
cuit has a different caseload.195 Further, judges within those circuits 
hear only a portion of those cases, which can create further inconsis-
tencies among the types of cases each of the judges hears.196 Because 
this measure relies on agreements and disagreements among judges, it 
is important to control for areas of case law where agreements are more 
or less likely.197 This can be done by independently analyzing the data 
from each significant area of law for each judge. Doing so, however, can 
increase dramatically standard errors for the metric because the sample 
sizes within each sub-category of case type will be far less than if all of 
the judge’s decisions were analyzed together.198 Thus, there is a need to 
balance case type controls with the desire for adequate samples to draw 
valid statistical inferences. 
 In this data set, one major distinction in case types proved impor-
tant in the commonness of disagreements among judges: criminal and 
civil cases. The level of disagreement was particularly pronounced be-
tween appellate and district judges. In criminal cases, appellate courts 
only reversed district court judgments in 14.6% of the cases. In con-
trast, over 26% of the judgments in civil matters were overturned by the 
192 See kuersten & Songer, supra note 23, at 2–4. 
193 See id.
194 See id.
195 See Paul R. Michel, Assuring Consistency and Uniformity of Precedent and Legal Doctrine 
in the Areas of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Entrusted Exclusively to the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit: A View from the Top, 58 Am. U. L. Rev. 699, 702 (2009) (describing the Fed-
eral Circuit as the only court of appeals that is based on subject-matter, not geography). 
196 See kuersten & Songer, supra note 23, at 2–4. 
197 See id.
198 See Lawless et al., supra note 95, at 425; Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 157–58. 
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U.S. courts of appeals. At each stage of the process, judges had their 
Ideology Scores determined as if they had been on panels with an aver-
age criminal/civil case mix to address the very different reversal rates. 
As a result, an individual judge’s data included a numerical breakdown 
of the civil and criminal cases heard, as described in further detail in 
Section C.199
2. Incorporating Standards of Review 
 By introducing the district court into the model, certain difficulties 
emerged. Notably, the process of review at each court level is quite dif-
ferent.200 The degree of deference between judges varies based upon 
the particular standards used and the hierarchal relationship of the 
judges being studied.201 These standards of review could increase or 
decrease the likelihood of reversal of district court judgments and 
thereby affects a judge’s Ideology Score.202 This study, thus, incorpo-
rates appellate standards of review as part of including district court 
judgments in the model. 
 Standards of review are formal rules used by appellate courts to 
determine the degree of deference that they should give to lower court 
judgments.203 These standards are regularly used in cases and are nor-
mally identified by judges in their opinions.204 Standards of review do 
not directly dictate the outcome in a case. Judges are free to reverse a 
district court judgment when using a deferential standard and to affirm 
a district court using non-deferential review.205 Consequently, if stan-
dards of review are serving a function, it is essential to incorporate the 
standard of review used by the appellate court for purposes of gauging 
judicial ideology using a multi-court measure.206 For example, a deci-
sion by an appellate judge to reverse a conservative district court judge 
is more significant if a deferential standard of review was applied in-
stead of a non-deferential one, such as de novo.207 In the aggregate, an 
199 See supra notes 243–248 and accompanying text. 






206 See Cross, supra note 9, at 228 (“[J]ust one legal standard, affirmance deference to 
the lower court decision, is consistently significant statistically and by far the most impor-
tant single variable substantively in explaining circuit court outcomes.”); Cross, supra note 
72, at 1500–02. 
207 See Cross, supra note 9, at 228; Cross, supra note 72, at 1500–02. 
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appellate judge who reverses district court judges of a particular ideol-
ogy when deferential standards are applied is substantially more ex-
treme in his or her ideology than a judge who only reverses in cases us-
ing a de novo standard.208 Similarly, a decision by an appellate court 
judge to affirm a liberal district court judge is less noteworthy when a 
deferential standard is applied because the affirmance might simply be 
a product of the standard of review.209
 Existing empirical scholarship supports the notion that standards 
of review create meaningful differences in reversal rates.210 A prior 
study by Frank Cross based upon the Songer Database for the U.S. 
courts of appeals found that standards of review are correlated with a 
change in reversal rates.211 Nevertheless, because the Songer Database 
only coded standards of review in cases involving executive agency re-
view, it is unclear if the results would extend to general application of 
such standards.212 Based upon the results of the data set used in this 
Article, the application of a deferential versus a non-deferential stan-
dard of review is strongly correlated to a change in reversal rates in dif-
ferent types of cases.213
 Figure 1, below, illustrates the results from all circuits in this study 
of the reversal rates with the three most commonly applied standards of 
review. The only non-deferential standard in Figure 1 is de novo re-
view.214 The other two standards afford deference to the judgments of 
district courts.215 The results, which show a higher reversal rate for non-
deferential standards than for deferential standards, are expected if 
standards of review serve their proper formal role by constraining ap-
pellate judges, such that those judges defer more often when standards 
of review dictate that they should do so.216
208 See Cross, supra note 72, at 1500–02. 
209 See id.
210 See id. at 1502–03. 
211 See id. 
212 See id. (coding only 808 cases). 
213 See Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scien-
tific Admissibility Standards, 91 Va. L. Rev. 417, 497 n.58 (2005). Conventionally, the value of 
p indicates a statistically significant relationship if it is less than .050. See id. P-values repre-
sent the probability that the results obtained were not due solely to chance. So, a p-value of 
.050 means that the results were 95% likely to be the result of something other than simple 
chance. 
214 See Cross, supra note 72, at 1502. 
215 See id.
216 See id. at 1501--02. Nevertheless, if there were perfect knowledge and rational deci-
sion-making among the litigants, at least in private actions, there should be no observable 
difference in reversal rates because the parties would act accordingly. See id.
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 Given the significant difference in reversal rates between the non-
deferential and deferential standards, incorporating reversal rates of dif-
ferent judges using deferential standards is a necessary step toward creat-
ing a valid multi-court measure of judicial ideology.217 As a result, the ju-
dicial votes were divided into cases with deferential, non-deferential, and 
unclear standards of review. 
3. Inter-Circuit Adjustments 
 Every federal Court of Appeals has, among other differences, var-
ied substantive law, procedural law, appellate judges, and district court 
217 See Cross, supra note 9, at 282; Edwards & Livermore, supra note 24, at 1908. The 
substantial role of standards of review is a significant rebuttal against the strong versions of 
the attitudinal and strategic models in regard to federal appellate court judges. See Cross, 
supra note 9, at 288. The attitudinal model in particular, which contends that judges make 
decisions based primarily upon policy preferences, has served as the basis for many em-
pirical studies. See id. at 11 (“[I]n ‘[other] corners of the university . . . it is widely consid-
ered a settled social scientific fact that law has almost no influence on the justices.’”) 
(quoting Howard Gillman, What’s Law Got to Do With It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the “Legal 
Model” of Judicial Decision Making, 26 Law & Soc. Inquiry 465, 466 (2001) (reviewing Har-
old J. Spaeth & Jeffrey A. Segal, Majority Rule or Minority Will: Adherence to 
Precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court (1999))); Edwards & Livermore, supra note 24, 
at 1908 (“[E]mpirical studies of judicial decisionmaking are too often informed by the 
‘attitudinal model’ of judicial behavior.”). Thus, under such a model, legal rules like stan-
dards of review that apply do not serve to constrain judicial decision-making. See Cross, 
supra note 9, at 11–12. Yet the result illustrated above indicates that at least some legal 
rules like standards of review have a powerful effect on the outcome in cases. 
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judges.218 Those differences raise the risk that, even if the measure suc-
cessfully describes ideology within each circuit, it would still fail to offer 
valid comparisons between circuits.219 Consequently, there is a concern 
any time a researcher compares the different U.S. courts of appeals that 
there might be unobserved variables that explain variation in results 
among the circuits.220
 For example, if a circuit court of appeals was largely appointed by 
Republican presidents, but the districts within the circuit were filled 
with appointees of Democratic presidents, one might expect differ-
ences in deference when compared to a circuit with balanced appoint-
ees.221 Similarly, differences in substantive law might explain why stan-
dards of review are applied in an uneven manner.222 For this reason, the 
findings in regards to different levels of ideology among circuits, as well 
as inter-circuit comparisons of individual judges, would be called into 
question.223
 This “baseline” issue emerges in this study in two ways.224 First, 
each circuit likely has different concentrations of liberals and conserva-
tives based upon the number of slots a particular appointing president 
filled.225 For example, of the eleven active judges sitting on the Eighth 
Circuit, eight were appointed by President George W. Bush,226 two by 
President Bill Clinton,227 and one by President Ronald Reagan.228 As-
suming that the three presidents did a reasonable job in appointing 
218 See kuersten & Songer, supra note 23, at 2--4. With the exception of the Federal 
Circuit, which is not included in this study, the circuits have geographic and not subject 
matter based jurisdiction. See Michel, supra note 195, at 702. 
219 See kuersten & Songer, supra note 23, at 2--4. 
220 See David C. Vladeck, Keeping Score: The Utility of Empirical Measurements in Judicial Selec-
tion, 32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1415, 1433–34 (2005) (discussing, in the context of Choi & Gulati, 
Tournament, supra note 108, the need to account for differences among circuit caseloads in 
creating empirical measures). 
221 See Cross, supra note 72, at 1503--04. 
222 See id.
223 See id.
224 See generally Brian Z. Tamanaha, Devising Rule of Law Baselines: The Next Step in Quan-
titative Studies of Judging, The Legal Workshop (Mar. 25, 2010), http://legal 
workshop.org/2010/03/25/2667 (submitted by Duke L.J.). 
225 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 149. 
226 Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Judges, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit, http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/newcoa/judge.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2010). Chief 
Judge James B. Loken and Judges William J. Riley, Michael J. Melloy, Lavenski R. Smith, 
Steven M. Colloton, Raymond Gruender, William Duane Benton, and Bobby E. Shepard 
were all appointed by President George W. Bush. Id.
227 Id. Judges Diana Murphy and Kermit E. Bye were appointed by President Bill Clin-
ton. Id.
228 Id. Judge Roger L. Wollman was appointed by President Ronald Reagan. Id.
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judges with ideologies similar to their own, the Circuit would appear to 
be very conservative. Judges Diana Murphy and Kermit Bye, the two 
Clinton appointees on the circuit, sat on panels on which 90% of their 
co-panelists were appointed by Republican presidents. Further, because 
the rate of dissent in the data set is approximately 2%, it is quite likely 
that Judges Murphy and Bye would agree with far more Republican ap-
pointees than Democratic ones. That Judges Murphy and Bye agreed 
with Republicans more often would be expected simply due to random 
panel assignment and not their actual ideologies. Thus, a valid model 
must account not just for the actual levels of agreement and disagree-
ment, but also the expected levels of agreement and disagreement.229
The effect is also duplicated among circuits with different political con-
centrations of district court judges.230
 Second, at least some body of cases in the data set was decided with 
no regard to the judge’s ideology.231 This is reflected by the high level 
of agreement among appellate judges232 as well as prior studies of the 
U.S. courts of appeals.233 For this reason, it can be very difficult to be 
sure that the decisions are not the result of some unobserved variable 
such as clear precedent or strategic, personal goals of a judge.234 These 
unobserved variables might be different in each Circuit. 
 The measure accounts for these difficulties at a general level by 
relying on rates, and not frequencies, of agreement. So, if a judge sat 
with twice as many judges appointed by Republican presidents, the 
measure would not be distorted because the percentage of agreement 
in the examined category is what is used in the final computations. Fur-
ther, each category of cases (i.e., criminal or civil) is weighted in the 
final score based upon the rate at which the average judge in the data 
set reviewed such cases. Based upon the political composition of the 
panel (including the district judge), standard of review used, and type 
of case, an expected score was computed for each judge. 
 Further, there are two specific reasons to believe that the inter-
circuit differences relevant to this study are effectively accounted for. 
First, the similarity of reversal rates among the various circuits weighs 
strongly in favor of a proposition that the differences among the cir-
229 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 162--63. 
230 See id.
231 See Fischman, supra note 162, at 3--4. 
232 In the data set, the overall agreement rate among judges on the Courts of Appeals 
in all cases was 99.4%. 
233 See Fischman, supra note 162, at 3--4. 
234 See Posner, supra note 59, at 29. 
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cuits are not as large as might be contended. An “Adjusted Reversal 
Rate,” which equalizes the number of criminal and civil cases in the 
Circuit data, was derived for each circuit. As Figure 2 illustrates, the dif-
ferences among the circuits were relatively small. 
The circuit least likely to reverse was the Eighth, which reversed at a rate 
of 16.0%. The circuit most likely to reverse was the Ninth with an Ad-
justed Reversal Rate of 26.1%. If political differences between the appel-
late and district court judges in a circuit were a significant factor driving 
judicial votes, one would expect the overall reversal rate to have been 
higher relative to other circuits. Similarly, variations among substantive 
law would have been expected to surface in the overall reversal rates. 
 Second, the circuits are not entirely insular.235 Senior judges often 
travel between circuits and issue opinions in each location.236 These 
points of interaction between the judges on different circuits can pro-
vide bridges for comparison among judges regardless of their home 
circuit.237 In this data set, there were 2472 votes by twenty-six judges 
who sat on panels in more than one circuit.238 In every instance where 
235 See Kelly Baker, Note, Senior Judges: Valuable Resources, Partisan Strategists, or Self-
Interest Maximizers, 16 J.L. & Pol. 139, 150 (2000) (“Senior judges may travel among cir-
cuits and districts to provide services as necessary.”). 
236 Id.
237 See id.
238 The traveling judges included in the data set were Judges Arthur L. Alarcon, Rug-
gero J. Aldisert, Bobby R. Baldock, Clarence A. Beam, Pasco M. Bowman II, Myron H. 
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one of the twenty-six judges voted, their Ideology Scores were broken 
down by the circuit in which the vote was registered. At the end, the 
differences in Ideology Scores for the collective group of travelling 
judges were calculated. The differences were further transformed into 
a per judge measure. These per judge measures were applied to each 
judge in the circuit in computing the Ideology Scores for those judges. 
4. Panel Effects 
 Consistent with prior studies of federal appellate courts, so-called 
“panel effects” were included in the measure.239 Panel effects are the 
degree to which the ideologies of a judge’s co-panelists change that 
judge’s vote.240 Panel effects are significant for the Ideology Scores in-
sofar as those Scores depend upon panel agreement rates and panel 
effects alter those agreement rates. To provide the best measure possi-
ble, the Ideology Scores should be adjusted to determine values as if a 
judge experienced no panel effects. 
 Although prior research on panel effects has focused exclusively 
on appellate co-panelists, this study assumes that district court judges 
are hidden fourth members of the appellate panel that form a larger 
“super panel.” Notably, in a significant development beyond prior re-
search, the data indicates that the party of the appointing president of 
the district judge, in relation to the panel judges, is correlated with the 
voting of the panelists reviewing the district court judgment.241
Bright, Robert E. Cowen, Richard D. Cudahy, David M. Ebel, Joseph J. Farris, William L. 
Garwood, John R. Gibson, Neil M. Gorsuch, David R. Hansen, Paul J. Kelly Jr., Robert B. 
King, Gilbert S. Merritt Jr., Robert J. Miner, Karen N. Moore, Jon O. Newman, Jane R. 
Roth, Eugene E. Siler Jr., Walter K. Stapleton, A. Wallace Tashima, John M. Walker Jr., and 
J. Clifford Wallace. 
239 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 149--50 (“One challenge that empirical schol-
ars must address, therefore, is the fact that panel composition effects can conceal the true 
extent of a judge’s ideological leanings. Because the influence of ideology on a judge’s 
voting behavior may be muted unless he or she is paired with at least one likeminded col-
league, a simple analysis of individual judicial voting records that fails to control for panel 
composition is likely to underestimate the true extent of the judge’s ideological prefer-
ences.”). 
240 See Cross & Tiller, supra note 89, at 2173--75 (finding that Republican and Democ-
rat-controlled panels were more likely to defer to agency decisions that corresponded with 
their majority’s ideology); Revesz, supra note 89, at 1768 (“[T]o a surprisingly strong ex-
tent, a judge’s vote is affected by the identity of her colleagues on the panel.”). 
241 Although a brief discussion of the panel effects findings are included here to pro-
vide the best possible Ideology Scores, the exact details of those findings are beyond the 
scope of this Article. The panel effects issues raised by the incorporation of the district 
court judge warrant a separate piece. 
1166 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:1133 
 To understand the relevance of this correlation, it is helpful to out-
line the various scenarios in which the relevant judges might be ar-
ranged. There are three basic alignments of panels and district judges, 
based upon the party of the appointing president: (1) the two co-
panelists and district judge might be of the same party; (2) the two-
panelists might be of the same party and the district judge is of the op-
posite party; and (3) the co-panelists are of different parties and the 
district judge is of the same party as one of the co-panelists. The varying 
disagreement rates on the panels in each of those situations are illus-
trated in Figure 3. 
 Although the absolute levels of disagreement (all below 1.50%) 
appear small, the ratio between them is significant. If the co-panelists 
were of the same party, but a different party from the district judge, the 
likelihood of disagreement among the studied judge and his or her co-
panelist increased substantially. Such situations created a disagreement 
rate almost 25% higher than when the panel judges were appointed by 
presidents of differing parties and over 31% greater than situations 
where the co-panelists and district judge were all of the same party. The 
results indicate that the “super panel” alignment has effects on panel 
judge agreement and must be included in the scoring system. 
 Additionally, the political alignment among the co-panelist appel-
late judges and district judge affects a judge’s decision to affirm or re-
verse the judgment of the district judge. Figure 4 illustrates the differ-
ences in reversal rates based upon the three alignments described 
above. Based upon their appointing president, if the two co-panelists 
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are of the same political party, but a different party than the district 
judge, then a judge is approximately 11% more likely to reverse the 
judgment of the district judge than in either of the two possible align-
ments. 
 The three major alignments can be disaggregated into six possible 
situations based upon the specific ideologies involved. Listing the po-
litical parties of the two co-panelists followed by the district judge party 
(based upon appointing president), those six alignments are: (1) DD-
D; (2) DD-R; (3) DR-D; (4) DR-R; (5) RR-D; and (6) RR-R. The signifi-
cance of the “super panel effects” described above for the Ideology 
Scores is based upon the rate at which a judge is situated in each of the 
six scenarios. If a judge encounters more DD-R than RR-D situations, it 
would be expected that the studied judge’s agreement rate with judges 
appointed by Democrats would increase over what would be expected 
with no panel effects. Also, that judge would be expected to reverse the 
judgments of more Republican appointees. Thus, a measure of ideol-
ogy that incorporates the district court should integrate the rate at 
which a judge encounters the possible political alignments. The specific 
application of the methodology for adjusting the Scores based upon 
those panel effects is described below in Section C.242
242 See infra notes 243--248 and accompanying text. 
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C. The Multi-Court Agnostic Approach and Its Advantages
 Based upon all of the above considerations, the Ideology Score in-
cludes several components. Initially, there is the Panel Score (PS), which 
is a judge’s agreement level with co-panelists. Similarly, a District Score 
(DS) is based upon agreements (affirmances) with the district judge 
being reviewed. An agreement represents a vote to affirm, and a dis-
agreement represents a vote to reverse, the lower court’s judgment. An 
agreement with a liberal judge is included as a negative value, and with a 
conservative judge, a positive value in order to best represent the com-
mon depiction of the left-right political spectrum. For there to be a valid 
agnostic model, there needs to be prior assessments of some judges. In 
this model, every judge is initially assigned a score based upon the ide-
ology of the appointing president (-1 for a Democratic appointee and 1 
for a Republican one). For the judge who is having an Ideology Score 
determined, however, he or she is treated as a blank slate with no prior 
indication of ideology. The Panel Score expression is as follows:243
Panel Score = AvgCrim * (RateAg Rep – RateAg Dem) + AvgCiv * 
(RateAg Rep – Rate Ag Dem)
The District Score was more complicated because of the need to incor-
porate standards of review. It was determined as follows:244
District Score = (AvgCrim * (WeightDef Crim * NumDef * (RateAff 
Rep – RateAff Dem) + WeightNon Crim * NumNon * (RateAff Rep 
– RateAff Dem) + WeightOth Crim * NumOth * (RateAff Rep – 
RateAff Dem)) + AvgCiv * (WeightDef Civ * NumDef * (RateAff 
Rep – RateAff Dem) + WeightNon Civ * NumNon * (RateAff Rep – 
RateAff Dem) + WeightOth Civ * NumOth * (RateAff Rep – RateAff 
Dem)))/(NumDef + NumNon + NumOth)
In addition to the Panel Score and District Score, there was a “Panel 
Effects Adjustment” made based upon the observed panel effects in the 
data. The equation for the raw total scores is as follows: 
243 AvgCrim = Average percentage of criminal cases; AvgCiv = Average percentage of 
civil cases; RateAg = Rate of agreement; Rep = Judges appointed by Republican presidents; 
Dem = Judges appointed by Democratic presidents. 
244 RateDef = Rate of agreement with deferential standard of review; RateNon = Rate of 
agreement with non-deferential standard of review; RateOth = Rate of agreement with un-
clear standard of review; WeightDef = Weight applied to deferential cases based upon differ-
ence in reversal rates; WeightNon = Weight applied to non-deferential cases; WeightOth =
Weight applied to cases with an unclear standard of review. 
2010] Empirical Study of the Ideologies of Judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals 1169 
Raw Score = Panel Score + District Score – Panel Effects Adjustment
 For example, the raw Ideology Score for Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson 
III was calculated as follows. In regards to his co-panelists on the Fourth 
Circuit, his agreements are illustrated in Figure 5 below. As the rate of 
agreement was very high for the federal appellate courts in the data, 
Judge Wilkinson only had five disagreements, two with Democratic ap-
pointees in civil cases, one with a Democratic appointee in a criminal 
case, and two with Republicans in civil cases. 
So, using the above equation, Judge Wilkinson’s Panel Score was de-
termined as follows: 0.442 (the average percentage of criminal cases) * 
(117/117 – 120/121) + 0.558 (the average percentage of civil cases) * 
(43/45 – 30/32), totaling 0.01373. In reviewing the judgments of dis-
trict courts, Figure 6 illustrates the breakdowns of Judge Wilkinson’s 
agreements with those courts based on affirmance rates in cases with 
different standards of review. Notably, the rate of disagreement (rever-
sals) was much higher with district court judges than with judges on the 
courts of appeals. 
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Figure 6 does not include the breakdown of cases based upon review of 
civil or criminal matters, but the allocation of those case types was in-
corporated into the Ideology Scores as follows. Judge Wilkinson’s Dis-
trict Score was: (0.446 (the average percentage of criminal cases)245 * 
(0.479 (weight for criminal cases with a deferential standard)246 * 119 * 
(69/83-25/26) + 0.241 (weight for criminal cases with a non-deferential 
standard) * 33 * (17/24 – 7/9) + 0.280 (weight for criminal cases with 
an unclear standard) * 68 * (51/56 – 9/12)) + 0.554 (the average per-
centage of civil cases) * (0.384 (weight for civil cases with a deferential 
standard) * 119 * (69/83-25/26) + 0.328 (weight for civil cases with a 
non-deferential standard) * 33 * (17/24 – 7/9) + 0.289 (weight for civil 
cases with an unclear standard) * 68 * (51/56 – 9/12))) / (119 + 33 + 
68). Because the respective weights added up to two, the total was di-
vided in half to keep the District Score on the same relative scale (0 to 
100%) as the other components. This yielded a District Score of -0.0110. 
245 Because data was incomplete for some district or appellate judges, the average per-
centages of civil and criminal cases for the Panel and District Scores vary slightly. 
246 The weightings were based upon the differential in reversal rates in each situation. 
So, deferential standard cases counted more than the non-deferential standard cases be-
cause reversal was rarer in such situations. 
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 The last portion of the raw Ideology Score constituted the Panel 
Effects Adjustment. As mentioned above, the combination of the par-
ties of the appointing presidents of a judge’s co-panelists and the dis-
trict judge under review had a statistically significant effect on a judge’s 
vote. In order to determine Judge Wilkinson’s Panel Effects Adjust-
ment, it was essential to tabulate the differing alignments in which 
Judge Wilkinson participated. Figure 7 includes the relevant align-
ments based upon the party of the appointing president for the two co-
panelists and the district judge under review. 
Each of the above six scenarios in Figure 7 were incorporated into the 
Panel Effects Adjustment. Of particular note, Judge Wilkinson’s ex-
perience in 2008 indicated that he sat on a disproportionate number of 
panels reviewing district judges appointed by Republican presidents. 
Consistent with prior research, panel effects were assumed to be sym-
metrical in that co-panelists in either ideological direction exercise the 
same pull. Because the judge studied was treated as an ideological un-
known, the key to panel effects were the other panelists and the district 
judge under review. 
 For each DD-D alignment, a judge was expected to agree at a rate 
of 98.89% as outlined in the previous Section. The same rate of agree-
ment is expected in each RR-R scenario. Thus, each of those polar op-
posite scenarios canceled out the panel effect of the opposite scenario. 
Any excess in either direction was accounted for. Similarly, DD-R and 
RR-D situations canceled each other out and the excess number was 
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the critical factor for the Panel Effects Adjustment. Split panels with 
either a Democrat or Republican-appointed district judge also offset 
each other. 
 For Judge Wilkinson, there was an excess of 14 (25 – 11) RR-R over 
DD-D scenarios, 10 (18 – 8) DD-R over RR-D situations, and 35 (63 – 
28) DR-R over DR-D alignments. The net result pulled Judge Wilkinson 
in a rightward direction compared to both his panel agreements and 
decisions to affirm or reverse. The percentage that each of the excess 
values represented of a judge’s total votes provided the basis for the 
weighting of that panel effect. Based upon the average panel effects 
values described above, Judge Wilkinson’s Panel Effects Adjustment was 
0.000965. A similar “super panel” effects adjustment was made based 
upon the expected reversal rates in each of the above scenarios. That 
Panel Effects Adjustment was 0.002375. Combining the Panel Score, 
District Score, and Panel Effects Adjustment yielded a Raw Ideology 
Score of -0.0006169. 
 Three final adjustments were made to yield the final Ideology 
Score. First, the Scores were adjusted for the circuit on which the judge 
primarily sat, based upon the circuit differentials determined from the 
data of traveling judges as described in Section B.3.247 The circuit dif-
ferentials assumed that a judge’s ideology would remain constant when 
traveling between circuits. So, if a judge exhibited a more liberal score 
in an “away” circuit over a “home” one, this implied that something 
about the “away” circuit (i.e., the circuit’s substantive law or case mix) 
made judges more apt to have voted in a liberal direction. As a result, a 
circuit differential adjustment was subtracted from the judge to remove 
the effects of being in a particular circuit. For Judge Wilkinson, who sat 
on the Fourth Circuit, his Raw Ideology Score was adjusted from -
0.0006169 to -0.0003216 because travelling judges voted more conser-
vatively while in the Fourth Circuit. 
 Second, because the Scores were relative, it was necessary to iden-
tify a midpoint judge. Because 68 of the 177 judges were appointed by 
Democratic presidents, the zero value was assigned to the average of 
the 68th and 69th most liberal judges. 
 Third, to put the scale into values that were more meaningful, the 
Scores were scaled so that the possible range could extend from nega-
247 See supra notes 218--238 and accompanying text. The adjustments for each of the cir-
cuits were determined to be as follows. First, -0.000332943; Second, -0.000258377; Third, 
5.70766E-05; Fourth, -0.000307391; Fifth, -0.000750237; Sixth, 0.001157225; Seventh, 
0.000560393; Eighth, -0.000159758; Ninth, -1.12073E-05; Tenth, 4.58607E-05; and Eleventh, -
0.000865095. 
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tive 100 for the most liberal judge and positive 100 for the most conser-
vative judge. Because the most liberal judge in the data set was further 
away from the judge with a 0 ideology, he had a resultant Ideology 
Score of -100. The most conservative judge had a score of 96.4. In the 
end, Judge Wilkinson had a score of 5.7, identifying him as a moderate 
conservative. 
 The Ideology Scores for a select portion of the judges are listed in 
the Appendixes to this Article. The distribution of the scores of the 177 
judges with adequate sample sizes is indicated in Figure 8. 
As would be expected, because Republican presidents have appointed 
the majority of judges on the federal appellate bench, there is a definite 
rightward distribution to the Ideology Scores of the 177 judges summa-
rized in Figure 8. Beyond the right-leaning nature of the histogram, the 
distribution is generally normal, with a heavy concentration of judges 
near the zero point representing the point of an ideological moderate 
on the relative scale. 
 As an example of a distribution of scores among a specific circuit, 
Figure 9 includes the results from the Seventh Circuit along with 
Common Space Scores. To provide easier comparisons, the Common 
Space Scores were scaled from -100 to 100 in a manner identical to the 
technique used for scaling the Ideology Scores. 
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 Although the judges in the Seventh Circuit largely follow the pat-
tern of the most liberal judges (as determined by the Ideology Scores) 
appointed by Democratic presidents, there are some notable excep-
tions. Judge Terence Evans, for example, was found to be a slight con-
servative judge even though his Common Space Score would indicate 
he was the most liberal of all the Seventh Circuit judges. Judges Kanne 
and Rovner also had Scores pointing in opposite ideological directions. 
Although the Common Space and Ideology Scores agreed that Judges 
Sykes and Easterbrook were the most conservative, the magnitude of 
those differences was quite substantial. Overall, the Ideology Scores in-
dicated the Seventh Circuit lacked a high degree of polarization, 
whereas the Common Space Scores showed substantial ideological 
variation. 
 In contrast with the Seventh Circuit, the Ideology Scores from the 
Sixth Circuit indicated a high degree of ideological polarization. Figure 
10 includes the Ideology and Scaled Common Space Scores for Sixth 
Circuit judges. 
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Even with the circuit differential adjustment, the Sixth Circuit had the 
most liberal judge in the data set ( Judge Merritt) and the two most 
conservative ( Judges Rogers and McKeague). The ideological battle 
lines seem much clearer in the Sixth Circuit than they were in the Sev-
enth. Notably, there is a high level of consistency between the Common 
Space and Ideology Scores for the most ideological judges in the cir-
cuit. In contrast, the measures diverged sharply in the Eighth Circuit, as 
exhibited in Figure 11. 
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Whereas the Common Space Scores considered Judge Shephard to be 
the most conservative judge in the circuit, the Ideology Scores place 
him as only a slight conservative. Whereas the Common Space Scores 
identified Judge Murphy as the most liberal judge in the country, the 
Ideology Scores put her in the moderate conservative group. Indeed, 
many of the most liberal judges according to the Ideology Scores had 
among the most conservative Common Space Scores. 
 In each of the eleven circuits studied, there were numerous differ-
ences between the Ideology and Common Space Scores. Although the 
variations are worth noting, the larger question remains: which meas-
ure is “right?” In the next Part, the Article will address whether the as-
sessments of the Ideology Scores are in any sense “better” than the ex-
isting measures.248
248 See infra notes 249–281 and accompanying text. 
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III. Results and Discussion
 Although the introduction of a new way to measure the ideology of 
judges on the U.S. courts of appeals is an important goal of this Article, 
there are two other questions that logically follow from such a scoring 
system. First, is this measure an improvement in a statistical sense over 
the alternatives that are available? Second, assuming there is scholarly 
value in the Ideology Scores, are they correlated with other significant 
components of a judge’s background or demographics such that the 
judge’s ideology could be predicted? Each of those questions is an-
swered below. 
A. Ideology Predictions
 Assessing how well a particular statistical model of judicial behavior 
“works” is not an easy task.249 Typically, models of this sort are assessed 
based upon how well they predict behavior.250 Nevertheless, it is almost 
certainly unrealistic that the model would be able to predict all out-
comes. What, then, constitutes success? In the area of judicial ideology 
measures, there has been very little scholarship concerning how various 
measures perform in practice.251 Professors Joshua Fischman and David 
Law recently published the first major performance test of the ideology 
measures for federal judges below the Supreme Court.252 They found 
little difference between the predictive power of the appointing presi-
dent’s political party and Common Space Scores in analyzing asylum 
claims in the Ninth Circuit.253
 In an effort to determine how the two leading measures perform 
against the Ideology Scores, there needs to be data that is strongly in-
dicative of ideology, but is otherwise unrelated to the measures being 
tested. As this Article notes at the outset, effective measures of the ide-
ology of judges serving on the U.S. courts of appeals do not exist, so 
this is somewhat of a research paradox. If a truly valid and reliable base-
line could be constructed, it would be the new leading measure of ide-
ology instead of a statistical tool to assess other measures. Of course, 
how would a researcher know that this new measure was truly the best 
without a valid and reliable measure to compare it against? 
249 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 172. 
250 See id. (“[P]racticing lawyers and social scientists want to know how judges will in 
fact behave.”). 
251 See id. at 190--91. 
252 Id.
253 See id. at 200--04. 
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 This Article follows the lead of the recent study by Fischman and 
Law and applies the three measures of ideology to actual cases to see 
how they perform in predicting the outcomes. Because there is simply 
no other available data set concurrent with the timing and courts ana-
lyzed in this study, there was no viable alternative but to use this study’s 
data set. In the Case Database, there are large numbers of cases in the 
civil rights area. In all, there were 1539 panels that considered claims 
under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act. It is generally assumed that a liberal judge will more often find in 
favor of the civil rights plaintiff. Consequently, each of the cases in 
those areas was coded based upon the prevailing party. The outcome 
was assumed to be liberal if a civil rights plaintiff won at the appellate 
level and conservative in the reverse circumstances. 
 There is, notably, a problem with testing the Ideology Scores in 
this study with the data set from which those scores are derived: circu-
larity.254 Circularity means that if the underlying data produces the 
model, the model should do well in predicting that data.255 This would 
give the Ideology Scores an apparent strong “home-field” advantage.256
To avoid this problem, the data used to assess predictions was removed 
from the computations of the underlying Ideology Scores. So, for the 
1539 panels used to test predictions, the votes were excluded from the 
calculations that produced the modified Ideology Scores.257
 Probit regressions were performed to determine if there was a cor-
relation between the ideology metrics and the outcomes in the ex-
cluded civil rights cases using each of the three measures.258 Of the 
1539 cases, 907 had scores for all three measures and either a clear vic-
tory or loss for the plaintiff. Notably, the data indicated that the modi-
fied net and median Ideology Scores for the panels had statistically sig-
nificant relationships with the outcomes in civil rights cases (p=0.00015 
for net values and p=0.0002 for median values) with coefficients indi-
254 See id. at 183 n.220. Circularity, also known as endogeniety, is the condition where 
the data being examined is also the source of the model being used. See id.
255 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 183 n.220. 
256 See id.
257 As a result of the exclusion, there were no identified civil rights cases included in 
the computation of the modified Ideology Scores. 
258 See Lawless et al., supra note 95, at 414. Logistic or probit regression is used in-
stead of linear regression when the outcome is categorical. Id. Because the case coding 
only afforded two options (criminal defendant win or loss), probit regression was used. See 
id.
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cating that liberal judges were more likely to rule for plaintiffs.259
Common Space Scores and the appointing president party did not per-
form as well. Net Common Space Scores did not have a statistically sig-
nificant relationship (p=0.1419) with a civil rights plaintiff victory, but 
the median Common Space Score did (p=0.0473). Neither the net 
(p=0.2962) nor median (p=0.1306) appointing party value had a sta-
tistically significant relationship to the case outcome. 
 Figure 12 illustrates that liberal Ideology Scores were correlated in 
a statistically significant manner (p=0.0007) with a civil rights plaintiff’s 
winning percentage before the judge and Figure 13 illustrates a similar 
relationship for Common Space Scores (p=0.0078). 
The downward slope of the line in Figure 12 indicates the degree to 
which being before a liberal judge (according to the Ideology Scores) 
increased the civil rights plaintiff’s chance of winning. For roughly 
every ten Ideology Score points in a liberal direction, a judge is 1.4% 
more likely to vote for a civil rights plaintiff. Notably, the expected rela-
tionship between liberalism and civil rights victories for plaintiffs is far 
less clear with the Common Space Scores. 
259 For net Ideology Scores, the coefficient was -0.0147, and for the median Ideology 
Scores it was -0.0149. In either case, the direction of the coefficient supports the expected 
outcome that judges with liberal Ideology Scores would more often find in favor of civil 
rights plaintiffs. 
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 Although the statistical significance tests and results in Figures 12 
and 13 are notable, further analysis provided greater confirmation of 
the predictive success of the Ideology Scores in civil rights cases. There 
is a variety of statistical tests to determine how well a model performs in 
predicting a particular set of outcomes. Chief among them is a method 
referred to as Pseudo R2, which is meant to “measure[] both the 
model’s goodness of fit and the strength of the association between the 
independent variable(s) and the dependent variable” using logistic and 
probit regression techniques.260 In every test, the Ideology Scores had a 
higher Pseudo R2 score than the Common Space Scores, which indi-
cates a better “goodness of fit.”261 Even though it is difficult to deter-
260 See Lawless et al., supra note 95, at 421. 
261 See id. at 411 (defining goodness of fit as, “in regression analysis, the concept of how 
well a regression model explains the data under examination”). Using the “fitstat” com-
mand in Stata, the following Pseudo R2 results were recorded for the Ideology Scores and 
Common Space Scores. The first number is the value representing the net Ideology Score 
for the panel, the second is the value representing the median value for the Ideology 
Scores of the panel, the third is the net Common Space Score of the panel, and the fourth 
is the median Common Space Score for the panel. Stata Pseudo R2: 0.0155, 0.0215, 0.0033, 
0.0060; McFadden’s R2: 0.015, 0.021, 0.003, 0.006; Cragg-Uhler R2: 0.022, 0.030, 0.005, 
0.008; Efron’s R2: 0.015, 0.021, 0.003, 0.005; McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2: 0.031, 0.044, 0.006, 
0.011. The overall low values of the Pseudo R2 values even for the Ideology Scores was ex-
pected as a large majority of the criminal law decisions do not appear to be driven by ide-
ology (as demonstrated by the high level of agreement). Consequently, the difference in 
scores simply illustrates the degree to which the Ideology Scores explain the variance 
based upon ideological decision making. 
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mine the degree to which the Ideology Scores outperformed the exist-
ing measures because of peculiarities associated with the computation 
of Pseudo R2 values, the results indicate that such a difference likely 
exists.262
B. Predicting Ideology
 Of significant value to politicians and scholars is identifying vari-
ables that are correlated with judicial ideology that are known before 
the judge is appointed.263 This Section considers a range of predictive 
options as well as assesses the performance of prior presidents in ap-
pointing like-minded judges.264 Further, the differences in the circuits 
of the U.S. courts of appeals are considered as factors that should be 
addressed in making predictions about judicial ideology.265
1. Appointing President and Ideology 
 Of the judges in the data sample, it might be contended that cer-
tain presidents were more or less successful in appointing judges to 
match their respective ideologies.266 In particular, Presidents Ronald 
Reagan and George W. Bush have been targeted as having placed 
“ideologues” on the federal courts.267 The data does show a clear statis-
262 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 198. 
263 See id. at 172. 
264 The Judge Database included a variety of demographic and biographical factors for 
each judge. Linear and logistic regressions were performed, as appropriate for the follow-
ing characteristics of judges: rating by the American Bar Association during the nomina-
tion process; age at the time the judge was appointed; the political composition of the 
Senate; birth year; race; district court experience; state court experience; Justice Depart-
ment experience; attorney general office experience; U.S. Attorney Office experience; 
Solicitor General office experience; law professor experience; private law firm experience; 
year appointed; Congress term during confirmation; whether the judge had taken senior 
status; and whether the judge was appointed during a recess appointment. In every case, 
the data did not support a statistically significant relationship between the Ideology Score 
and the listed factors. Because the regression analysis was limited to the 177 judges with 
sufficient sample sizes, it is possible that with more data for more judges, some of the fac-
tors might be correlated with Ideology Scores upon further study. 
265 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 150. 
266 See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, The Current Assault on Constitutional Rights and Civil Liber-
ties: Origins and Approaches, 99 W. Va. L. Rev. 769, 808 n.182 (1997) (comparing the judicial 
appointments of Presidents Bill Clinton, Ronald Reagan, and George W. Bush); Scott 
Nance, George W. Bush Court Appointments Emphasized Ideology over Diversity, On the Hill, 
June 28, 2009, at A1 (“The judicial appointments of former president George W. Bush 
suggests [sic] that his motivation for appointing nontraditional judges was driven more by 
ideology and strategy than concerns for diversity . . . .”). 
267 See Nance, supra note 266; Strossen, supra note 266, at 808 n.182. 
1182 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:1133 
tically significant correlation between the appointing president and 
Ideology Scores.268 Yet the data did not support the hypothesis that 
Presidents Reagan and George W. Bush were uniquely responsible for 
appointing ideological judges. Figure 14 illustrates the average ideology 
of the judicial votes of the appointees of the last five presidents for the 
177 judges with adequate samples. 
 Of the appointees of the three Republican presidents who are cur-
rently serving on the U.S. courts of appeals, President George H.W. 
Bush’s score stands out as being the highest. Notably, all three Republi-
can presidents and President Carter appointed more ideological judges 
than President Clinton. Nevertheless, given the few presidents in the 
sample, it is difficult to infer any larger theory about the nature of the 
politics of presidents in regards to their appointed judges. Further, be-
cause many of the appointed judges for the older presidents have re-
tired, the sample of appointees for those presidents is not random. As 
the time of appointment moves further back in time, the validity of the 
results is potentially lessened. 
268 The statistically significant correlation was a value of p=0.0003. 
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2. Circuit and Ideology 
 In studying or controlling for the ideology of judges, it is impor-
tant to recognize that the different circuits have varied ideologies.269
This could simply be due to the politics of the judges on the circuit or 
cultural factors among the judges such as a preference for consensus.270
Regardless of the cause, it is essential to be able to identify whether re-
sults in future studies are the product of circuit ideology instead of the 
theorized variables.271
 Among the regional circuits, there have emerged reputations for 
certain circuits being more liberal or conservative than others.272 In 
particular, the Ninth Circuit is regularly labeled as liberal273 while the 
Fourth,274 Fifth,275 and Eleventh276 Circuits are considered to be con-
servative. The specific predictions based upon the conventional wisdom 
of the various circuits are only partially supported by the data as illus-
trated in Figure 15. 
269 See Fischman, supra note 162, at 3. 
270 See id.
271 See id.
272 See, e.g., Bettina Boxall, Bush-Era Road Rule on Forests Scrapped, Chi. Trib., Aug. 6, 
2009, at 34 (describing the Ninth Circuit as liberal); Bill Rankin, Injured Deputy’s Suit 
Thrown Out, Atlanta J.-Const., Aug. 27, 2008, at 7C (describing the Fourth Circuit as 
conservative); Charlie Savage, Obama Backers Fear Opportunities to Reshape Judiciary Are Slip-
ping Away, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 2009, at A20 [hereinafter Savage, Obama Backers] (describ-
ing the Eleventh Circuit as conservative); David G. Savage, California Death Row Case Back in 
Court, Chi. Trib., Nov. 2, 2009, at 13 [hereinafter Savage, Death Row Case] (describing the 
Fifth Circuit as conservative). 
273 See Boxall, supra note 272. 
274 See Savage, Obama Backers, supra note 272. 
275 See Savage, Death Row Case, supra note 272. 
276 See Rankin, supra note 272. 
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Although the Ninth is the fifth most liberal circuit, it does not appear 
to be uniquely liberal. Similarly, the Fourth, Fifth and, Eleventh Circuits 
have conservative scores, but they are not the most conservative. In-
deed, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits are much more conservative on 
average than any of the three circuits with right-wing reputations. The 
result from the Fourth Circuit should not be terribly surprising as the 
reputation of the Fourth Circuit was in part based upon a time when 
there were notorious conservatives on the bench.277 It is reasonable 
that the turnover in judges could account for a leftward move in the 
circuit’s net ideology.278 The First Circuit’s score appears to be a signifi-
cant liberal outlier. But this is almost surely due to the small sample size 
from that circuit. The First Circuit has by far the smallest docket of any 
of the circuits and only had 278 cases in the data set. Additionally, be-
cause of the limited number of qualifying judges (six), the interactions 
between judges were not as varied as the other circuits. Further re-
search is warranted to determine if the First Circuit judges are as liberal 
as the Ideology Scores indicate. 
 Another significant consideration in researching judicial ideology 
at the federal appellate level concerns the homogeneity of circuits in 
277 See Larry Margasak, Court Nominee Survives Senate Test, Bos. Globe (Nov. 18, 2009), 
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2009/11/18/court_nominee_ 
survives_senate_test (“Last week, the Senate confirmed US District Judge Andre Davis . . . 
giving Democratic nominees a 6-to-5 edge on the Fourth Circuit that once was a conserva-
tive legal bastion.”). 
278 See id.
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terms of ideology. Although the net ideology numbers paint part of the 
picture, the distribution of the judges along the ideological spectrum is 
also significant. In Figure 16, the average score differential (in either 
ideological direction) for each circuit for the judges in the 177-judge 
sample is indicated. 
Based upon the data, the Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits appear to 
have sharp ideological divisions between judges. In contrast, the Second, 
Fifth, and Eleventh Circuit judges are largely ideologically homogenous. 
The variance cannot be explained merely by circuit size. Indeed, the 
Fifth Circuit and Ninth Circuit have the two largest sets of judges in the 
177-judge sample and are on opposite ends of the variance spectrum. 
The finding that the Ninth and Sixth Circuits are especially polarized by 
ideology is consistent with the anecdotal indications that those circuits 
have been plagued by ideological divides among the judges.279
3. Law School and Ideology 
 Reviewing biographical factors related to judicial ideology might 
uncover certain factors that are related to future judicial ideology. A 
common refrain of conservative critics of the federal judiciary is to 
279 See Boxall, supra note 272 (describing the Ninth Circuit as having “a liberal reputa-
tion”); R. Jeffrey Smith, Ideological Warfare Rages on Federal Appeals Courts, Wash. Post, Dec. 
8, 2008, at A1 (“Ideological trench warfare is frequently on display in the 6th Circuit’s 
austere fourth-floor hearing room . . . which shifted to Republican-appointee control in 
mid-2005.”). 
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blame “liberal judicial activism” on Ivy League educations.280 Judges on 
the courts of appeals actually come from a wide range of law schools 
making a test of such a hypothesis possible. A linear regression indi-
cated that there is substantial evidence in the data to support such a 
claim (p=0.0151). Figure 17 illustrates how law school ranking as de-
termined by the 2009 U.S. News & World Report Law School Rank-
ings281 are related to the Ideology Scores of the 177 studied judges. 
The correlation is unmistakable, as the data indicates that for approxi-
mately every ten “lower” ranks of law schools, a judge’s Ideology Score 
increased (in a conservative direction) by forty points. Notably, a re-
gression showed no support for the idea that private schools were more 
likely to be associated with liberal judges (p=0.0587). Further, the data 
indicated the same relationship in both appointees of Republican and 
Democratic presidents, as indicated in Figures 18 and 19. 
280 See, e.g., Thomas Sowell, The Great Danger of Supreme Quotas, Human Events Online
( July 7, 2005), http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=8006 (contending that “lib-
eral judicial activism” is a product of an elite law school mentality). 
281 The U.S. News & World Report rankings are available at http://grad-schools.us 
news.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools. Although the flaws 
in the U.S. News & World Report Rankings are many, it is simply the only ranking system to 
cover all of the schools in the data set. See Gary Blankenship, Law Schools: Time to Get Practi-
cal?, Fla. Bar News, Aug. 1, 2009, at A1 (describing the “disproportionate influence” of 
the rankings on legal education). 
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 One possible explanation for the strong correlations indicated 
above is that the circuit of the judge is a variable responsible for both 
the ideology and law school attended. Theoretically, because elite law 
schools are concentrated in a few circuits, it is likely that certain circuits 
would have a higher concentration of elite law school graduates. If 
those circuits were also politically liberal, then the correlation might be 
explained entirely by the circuit and not the law school attended. A sep-
arate regression between the Ideology Scores and law school ranking 
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was performed while controlling for the judges’ circuits, and the corre-
lation was still statistically significant (p=0.0230). Although the data 
does not indicate a clear causation, the finding is significant enough to 
warrant further investigation. 
4. Government Experience and Ideology 
 Although a variety of background factors were examined in rela-
tion to the Ideology Scores, government experience was the only other 
factor that showed a statistically significant relationship. It was hypothe-
sized that because conservatism is more strongly associated with an 
aversion to government, judges who had been affiliated with govern-
ment bodies (outside of the judiciary) would be more liberal than 
judges without such experience. A regression analysis on the data of-
fered strong support for the hypothesis (p=0.0008). Figure 20 indicates 
that the effect was pronounced for both appointees of Republican and 
Democratic presidents. 
The correlation was dramatic enough to provide a very strong indicator 
of liberalism on the federal judiciary. Combined with law school at-
tended, government experience provides a substantial hint about the 
characteristics that might be strongly connected to the politics of a 
judge on the U.S. courts of appeals. Certainly, a Democratic president 
might be worried about a graduate of a lower-ranked law school with 
no government work experience. Similarly, the data indicate that a Re-
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publican president should be wary of elite law school graduates who 
have worked in the public sector. 
IV. Data Analysis
 The results above indicate some new findings about the nature of 
ideology in the U.S. courts of appeals. Nevertheless, there are reasons 
to be cautious about broad conclusions. As with any empirical study, it 
is helpful to examine reliability, validity, and potential limitations of the 
data. Each of those areas of concern is discussed below. 
A. Reliability
 Reliability is the degree to which the measurement would yield the 
same results when applied by others.282 Because this study is the first to 
systematically analyze judicial ideology among federal judges at the 
federal appellate level based upon actual performance on the bench 
with a unique data set, reliability cannot be determined by comparison 
to other empirical studies.283 Instead, reliability is evaluated by the qual-
ity of the coding and analysis.284
 Case data was acquired from LexisNexis for each of the circuits 
studied. Some of the objective data (such as party names, citation, and 
opinion date) was harvested directly from downloads of cases using a 
proprietary computer software program.285 The program has been used 
previously in other studies reviewing federal appellate court opin-
ions.286 The remaining data was coded by law students and law library 
staff. Four of the students were solely responsible for the Case Database 
and one created the biographical information database. 
 After an initial coding of the key variables in the Case Database, a 
second coding of those variables was performed for random samples of 
the data by persons other than those who did the original coding for 
the individual cases, yielding acceptable inter-coder reliability levels for 
282 Epstein & King, supra note 124, at 83 (“Reliability is the extent to which it is possi-
ble to replicate a measurement, reproducing the same value (regardless of whether it is 
the right one) on the same standard for the same subject at the same time.”). 
283 See id.
284 See id.
285 See David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction 
Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International Trade Commission, 
50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1699, 1735 n.174 (2009) (searching for ITC cases using Westlaw 
and LexisNexis); Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?, supra note 137, at 239 (locating Rule 36 
cases through a Westlaw search). 
286 See Schwartz, supra note 285, at 1735 n.174; Schwartz, supra note 137, at 239. 
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the tested variables. In addition, a variety of checks were performed to 
ensure internal consistency of variables that were necessarily intercon-
nected.287
B. Validity
 Validity is the degree to which the measurement used in an empiri-
cal study reflects the concept measured.288 The assessment of the study 
is more complex for validity than for reliability.289 Generally, validity can 
be understood along a variety of axes.290 For example, Professors Lee 
Epstein and Gary King, in their call for improved empirical legal schol-
arship, identified three possible ways to view validity: “facial validity, un-
biasedness, and efficiency.”291 Although establishing each of those cate-
gories is unnecessary, it is helpful to keep them in mind when reviewing 
a study trying to measure a complex concept like “judicial ideology.”292
Each of those categories is discussed below, but, initially, it is important 
to first return to the discussion of what exactly this study is measuring. 
1. Concept Measured 
 As detailed in Part I.A, “judicial ideology” can be a slippery con-
cept that is tricky to capture in empirical studies.293 Consequently, it is 
helpful to revisit the topic of whether the results above are truly indica-
tive of judicial ideology. There are at least two reasons to believe that 
Ideology Scores describe judicial ideology. 
 First, the success of the scores in predicting case outcomes against 
the current dominant models is strong evidence that the study is prop-
erly directed. Even without the relative comparisons with other models, 
the Ideology Scores were shown, based upon the data, to have statisti-
cally significant relationships with outcomes in civil rights cases. 
287 For example, the party labels in the coding includes “criminal defendant.” In order 
for there to be a criminal defendant, the outcome for the prevailing party cannot be “civil 
plaintiff” or “civil defendant.” A variety of cross-checks were employed to quality check and 
correct errors within the data set. 
288 Epstein & King, supra note 124, at 87 (“Validity is the extent to which a reliable 
measure reflects the underlying concept being measured.”). 
289 See id.
290 See id.
291 Id. at 89. 
292 See id. (“[N]o one of these is always necessary, and together they are not always suf-
ficient, even though together they are often helpful in understanding when a measure is 
more or less valid.”). 
293 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 156. 
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 Second, although this Article does not deploy the same methodol-
ogy as the Martin-Quinn scores, it relies on the same basic assumptions 
about determining ideology: agreement and disagreement between 
judges is indicative of shared values.294 With strong prior assessments of 
some judges, those values can be mapped onto an ideological scale.295
Insofar as the Martin-Quinn scores have become the leading measure 
of U.S. Supreme Court justice ideology, the validity of the Ideology 
Scores should be similarly well-grounded.296
2. Facial Validity 
 As Professors Epstein and King noted, “[a] measure is facially valid 
if it is consistent with prior evidence, including all quantitative, qualita-
tive, and even informal impressionistic evidence.”297 Even though this 
Article contends that the model outlined herein offers a viable alterna-
tive to prior measures of judicial ideology, for validity purposes, it is 
helpful to consider how those values relate to each other.298 Linear re-
gressions were performed to determine if there was a statistically sig-
nificant relationship between the Ideology Scores and both the Com-
mon Space Scores and ideology of the appointing president. In both 
instances, such a relationship was supported by the data.299
 Further, as illustrated in Appendix A, a great many of the judges fit 
expectations of ideology based upon their appointing presidents. Still, 
it is helpful to consider some of the higher profile judges in regards to 
their Ideology Scores. Figure 21 below indicates, for thirteen notable 
judges, the Ideology Scores and scaled Common Space Scores. 
294 See Jacobi & Sag, supra note 21, at 3--4. 
295 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 162--63. 
296 See Jacobi & Sag, supra note 21, at 3. 
297 Id.
298 See Epstein & King, supra note 124, at 87. 
299 p=0.000 in both cases. 
1192 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:1133 
 Among the thirteen judges listed in Figure 21, there are six judges 
who were rumored to be Supreme Court candidates for Presidents Bush 
and Obama ( Judges Wardlaw, Wood, Cook, Williams, Thomas, and 
Jones),300 one confirmed justice ( Justice Sotomayor), one well-known 
social conservative who recently left legal academia (Michael McCon-
nell), and five prominent conservative jurists ( Judges Posner, Wilkinson, 
Boggs, O’Scannlain, and Easterbrook).301 In most instances, their Ideol-
ogy Scores fall on the side of the spectrum with which they are strongly 
associated. As might be expected, Judges Easterbrook and O’Scannlain, 
who are conservative icons on their respective circuits, are amongst the 
300 Stuart Taylor Jr. & Evan Thomas, Keeping It Real, Newsweek, Nov. 14, 2005, at 22 
(contrasting Judge Jones, as a potential Supreme Court appointee, to Justice Alito); Bash, 
supra note 2. 
301 Peter Slevin, Was Blogger Threatening Judges, or Just Exercising Free Speech?, St. Paul. 
Pioneer Press, Aug. 16, 2009, at A4 (reporting threats made against Judges Easterbrook, 
Posner, and Bauer on the Seventh Circuit); Carol J. Williams, Three Key Players Reflect the 9th 
Circuit’s Ideological Span, L.A. Times, Apr. 19, 2009, at A13 (describing the three most 
prominent judges on the Ninth Circuit as Judges Kozinski, Reinhardt, and O’Scannlain); 
Benjamin Wittes, The Best Judges He Can’t Pick, Wash. Post, May 3, 2009, at B01 (discussing 
potential replacements for Justice Souter on the Supreme Court). 
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most conservative judges in the data set.302 Of significance, Judge 
O’Scannlain appears as conservative using the Ideology Scores, in ac-
cordance with his reputation, whereas the Common Space Scores con-
sidered him to be the most moderate of all of the Republican appoint-
ees in the data set. 
 Another interesting example, not included above, is Judge Richard 
Tallman of the Ninth Circuit. President Clinton nominated Judge 
Tallman even though it was known that Judge Tallman was a Republi-
can.303 Because the Common Space Scores assume every Clinton 
nominee was liberal, his Common Space Score was –0.327. Using the 
Ideology Score method, however, Judge Tallman was the most conser-
vative judge appointed by a Democratic president, having a score of 
54.7. At least in the case of Judge Tallman, the information about his 
background politics was borne out in the Ideology Scores. 
 Notably, President Obama’s decision to nominate Sonia So-
tomayor to the Supreme Court may have resulted in the selection of a 
moderate liberal among frequently-mentioned candidates.304 Although 
Judges Wardlaw, Wood, and Williams were further from the midpoint 
than Justice Sotomayor, Justice Sotomayor was a clear liberal in 2008 
according to the Ideology Scores. At this point in time, however, there 
is no data connecting a judge’s ideology based upon appellate court 
behavior with his or her ideology on the Supreme Court. Indeed, if one 
subscribes to some version of the strategic model of judging, an appel-
late judge may intentionally moderate his or her views on the appellate 
court to increase the chances of nomination to the Supreme Court.305
3. Unbiasedness 
 According to Epstein and King’s categorization of validity tests, “[a] 
measurement procedure is unbiased if it produces measures that are 
right on average across repeated applications.”306 Because this study re-
302 See Slevin, supra note 301; Williams supra note 301. 
303 Henry Weinstein, Court to Consider Delay of Recall Vote, L.A. Times, Sept. 20, 2003, at A1. 
304 See Charlie Savage, Conservatives Map Strategies on Court Fight, N.Y. Times, May 17, 
2009, at A1 (discussing President Obama’s contemplated replacements for Justice Souter). 
305 See Miriam A. Cherry & Robert L. Rogers, Tiresias and the Justices: Using Information 
Markets to Predict Supreme Court Decisions, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1141, 1155 (2006) (“The stra-
tegic model . . . suggests that judges act in ways that maximize their incentives and their 
prestige.”); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Every-
body Else Does), 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1, 5 (1993) (“Supreme Court Justices are often ap-
pointed from the ranks of federal court of appeals judges and although the probability of 
such an appointment is low . . . it figures in the thinking of some judges.”). 
306 Epstein & King, supra note 124, at 92 (emphasis omitted). 
1194 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:1133 
lies on “revealed preferences” of the voting blocs combined with a for-
mal rule that is rarely in dispute (standard of review), the risk of bias in 
measurement should be less than relying on other techniques.307 The 
standard of review is often briefed by both parties, and in a random 
sample of the briefs in one hundred cases in the Case Database, there 
were no instances where the parties had a dispute as to the applicable 
standard(s) of review. Further, the Ideology Scores appear to avoid some 
of the problems of biased coding of case outcomes in regards to political 
preferences of the judges.308
4. Efficiency 
 The last Epstein and King test for validity is that “[e]fficiency helps 
us choose among several unbiased measures, with the basic idea being 
to choose the one with the minimum variance.”309 In relation to the 
Common Space Scores and the party of the appointing president, there 
is reason to believe that the Ideology Scores are more efficient.310 Typi-
cally, if a particular measure omits relevant information, it is less effi-
cient because there will be less consistency in application.311 Each of the 
three measures omits some relevant information.312 Ideology Scores do 
not factor in the political factors at the time of nomination. In contrast, 
Common Space Scores and the party of the appointing president do not 
include any information regarding a judge’s behavior on the bench.313
Rather than omitting such information, it seems reasonable to believe 
that inclusion of significant performance data, as opposed to political 
307 See id. at 94 (“So, instead of (or sometimes in addition to) asking respondents to 
answer research questions directly, it is usually better to look for revealed preferences, 
which are consequences of theories of motive that are directly observable in real behav-
ior.”) (emphasis omitted). 
308 See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 24, at 1924–25 (“Some studies seek to code case 
outcome according to topical or political criteria. For example, in an empirical study done by 
Glendon Schubert, Supreme Court decisions issued between 1946 and 1963 were coded 
along two axes—political liberal/conservative and economic liberal/conservative. Cases also 
have been coded as pro-/antienvironment, pro-/anticriminal defendant, pro/anti-civil rights, 
and so on. Perhaps the most common metric used in empirical studies is a simple ‘left/right’ 
or ‘liberal/conservative’ binary. These topical or political measures used to describe cases will 
necessarily simplify a court’s holding and reduce what may be a complex and nuanced deci-
sion into an often uninformative binary.”). 
309 Epstein & King, supra note 124, at 95. 
310 See id. at 95--96. 
311 See id. at 96 (“The result is that any one application of the measure with more in-
formation will be likely to yield an answer closer to the truth than any one application of 
the measure with less information.”). 
312 See id. at 95--96. 
313 See id.
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factors during the nomination process, in the Ideology Scores would 
produce a more efficient model of judicial ideology.314 This conclusion 
is borne out by the predictive success of the Ideology Scores versus the 
other two measures. 
C. Limitations of the Data
 There are several limitations to the data utilized in this study. Con-
sequently, as with any empirical study, it is important to recognize those 
limitations so that inferences from the data are properly drawn. Be-
cause this is the first study using this newly created data set, the need to 
carefully analyze the confines of the data is even more important. 
There are several ways in which the data used herein is notably limited. 
1. Time Limitations 
 All the data studied in this Article were from opinions issued in 
2008. This has several implications. First, it is uncertain whether the 
judges studied have always had the same ideology or if their ideology 
has changed over time. Similarly, going forward, the judges may drift in 
their ideologies.315 Second, the results should not be used to create in-
ferences about all of the judges appointed by a particular president. 
Especially for presidents that served decades ago, the remaining ap-
pointees who were still issuing opinions in 2008 may not be representa-
tive of the overall population of judges appointed by those presidents. 
2. Data-Gathering Limitations 
 The study also excluded opinions that did not use language rele-
vant to a standard of review because of the way the LexisNexis searches 
were executed.316 That omission means that a substantial portion of 
opinions by judges were not considered in this study. If the sample used 
herein were a random sample of the overall opinion population, the 
omission would not be a statistical problem. It is possible, however, that 
in the excluded cases, had the judges included a standard of review, 
there might have been different results that could have altered conclu-
sions derived from the data of this study. Nonetheless, if the levels of 
excluded opinions were relatively consistent among judges, the order 
of the Ideology Scores should not substantially change. 
314 See id.
315 See Epstein et al., supra note 145, at 1540. 
316 See Motomura, supra note 186, at 474; Scott, supra note 187, at 305. 
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 Another limitation of the data concerns the degree to which cer-
tain mixes of case types might distort the results. The various regres-
sions that were run in this study controlled for the case mix between 
criminal and civil cases.317 Nevertheless, it is possible that finer distinc-
tions in composition of caseload per circuit and per judge could ac-
count for some of the variation in Ideology Scores. Without more data, 
it is impossible to assess the significance of this limitation. 
3. Coding Limitations 
 As this study relied entirely on a metric that measured certain as-
pects of the opinion itself, some potential problems emerge. An initial 
problem with such metrics is that they rely on judicial rhetoric that 
might only be window dressing for the real basis for the opinion.318 As 
Judge Posner has commented, examining the rhetoric of judicial opin-
ions to determine what a judge is really doing will often mislead the 
observer.319 Because the measure used herein takes a judge’s words at 
face value, this is an applicable concern.320 Standards of review, how-
ever, do not fit the normal rubric of potentially misleading rhetoric.321
The standards are based upon long lines of cases, are usually agreed 
upon in the competing party briefs, and do not determine the case 
outcome alone.322 As a result, this study does not raise significant con-
cerns about overreliance on judicial rhetoric.323
 A variation on this objection stems from the inherent reduction of 
an opinion to quantifiable data that occurs in a model like the one 
used herein.324 Because judicial opinions are not written with a particu-
lar formula, the difficulty of coding different styles and forms should 
not be underestimated.325 Reducing lengthy opinions to a couple of 
variables may miss a substantial amount of nuance in the opinion.326
This criticism is prominent among judges who have been disconcerted 
with using quantitative analysis to understand judicial decision mak-
317 See supra notes 192--199 and accompanying text. 
318 See Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 827, 865 
(1988) (“We should not be so naive as to infer the nature of the judicial process from the 
rhetoric of judicial opinions.”). 
319 See id.
320 See id.
321 See Cross, supra note 72, at 1500. 
322 See id.
323 See id.
324 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 156. 
325 See id.
326 See id.
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ing.327 In this case, however, the key variables were relatively easy to 
code and objective in nature. Disposition and standards of review are 
part of the formula for many opinions, and the results rely almost ex-
clusively on those variables. Spotting those portions of the opinion does 
not rely on any formulaic conception of the opinion itself. 
4. Selection Effects 
 As with any project that studies court cases that are included in a 
sample based upon the actions of third parties (i.e., litigants), there is a 
concern about selection effects.328 A selection effect is “a causal relation-
ship between the distribution of disputes and other variables of litiga-
tion.”329 There are many points during litigation when a selection effect 
could occur, including pre-filing, pretrial, during trial, pre-verdict, post-
verdict, pre-appeal, during appeal, and post-appeal.330 If a selection ef-
fect distorted the case mix in a way important to the study, it would call 
into question the study’s validity.331
 Because this study is exclusively focused on the behavior of judges 
on the U.S. courts of appeals, the need to account for certain selection 
effects is limited.332 Selection effects are only significant for this study if 
they distort the case mixes of individual judges or circuits relative to 
other judges or circuits.333 Otherwise, as long as the selection effects are 
consistent among the units of measure, they should not implicate the 
validity of the Ideology Scores. 
327 See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 24, at 1910. 
328 See Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 
22 J. Legal Stud. 187, 203--05 (1993) (“[T]he disputes that are most likely to influence 
legal doctrine tomorrow are those in which the divergence in litigants’ expectations . . . is 
greatest . . . . This imbalance should influence the menu of issues reaching appellate 
courts.”); George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Legal 
Stud. 1, 2 (1984) (“It is well known, however, that only a very small fraction of disputes 
comes to trial and even a smaller fraction is appealed . . . . It is very difficult to infer spe-
cific characteristics from observations of [appeals cases], especially where there is no evi-
dence that the observations (the disputes selected for appeal) were selected randomly.”); 
Cass Sunstein, Judging National Security Post-9/11: An Empirical Investigation, 2008 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 269, 271 (“A central point here involves selection effects: Because litigants are re-
sponsive to the likelihood of victory, it is important to be careful in drawing lessons from 
any particular invalidation rate.”) (emphasis omitted). 
329 Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of the Asymmetry 
in the Right to Appeal, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 19 n.55 (1990). 
330 See id. at 19--28. 
331 See id.
332 See id. at 25--28. 
333 See id.
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 At the most basic level, selection effects rely on theoretical concep-
tions of the judiciary about the incentives of litigants.334 Under the 
Priest-Klein hypothesis, one would expect appellate outcomes to split 
50% between affirmances and reversals since the parties would settle 
appropriately to avoid other outcomes.335 In the data set in this study, 
however, and consistent with prior examinations of the Priest-Klein hy-
pothesis, the results do not support the hypothesis in its broadest form 
because affirmances occur at a much higher rate than 50% regardless 
of the standard of review used. Importantly, in criminal cases, the set-
tlement (plea) structure creates different incentives such that a 50% 
split is unlikely to occur. Nevertheless, even in the non-criminal cases 
within the sample, the affirmance rate was 72.2%, far higher than the 
expected equilibrium rate. 
 The explanation for the difference between the observed rates 
and the Priest-Klein hypothesis also addresses the issues raised by se-
lection effects more broadly. In the appellate environment, in many 
instances, the marginal cost of appeal is low compared to that of a 
trial.336 Further, there is significant uncertainty in predicting appeal 
outcomes.337 Beyond the issues being legally close,338 the parties will 
not know who composes the panels until shortly before the oral ar-
gument.339 By that time, the briefing was long since completed, and 
any settlement is unrealistic.340
334 See Sunstein, supra note 328, at 271. 
335 See Priest & Klein, supra note 328, at 5. A variety of studies have looked at whether 
the Priest & Klein hypothesis is supported by empirical evidence. See, e.g., Theodore Eisen-
berg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. Legal 
Stud. 337, 342--47 (1990); Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to 
Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 Wash. U. L.Q. 569, 590 (2001); Robert E. Thomas, 
The Trial Selection Hypothesis Without the 50 Percent Rule: Some Experimental Evidence, 24 J. Le-
gal Stud. 209, 226--27 (1995). 
336 Meehan Rasch, Not Taking Frivolity Lightly: Circuit Variance in Determining Frivolous Ap-
peals Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, 62 Ark. L. Rev. 249, 264 (2009) (“[E]motion-
laden, nonprevailing parties have little to lose by appealing, especially given the minimal 
court costs associated with taking an appeal.”). 
337 See Richard L. Revesz, Litigation and Settlement in the Federal Appellate Courts: Impact of 
Panel Selection Procedures on Ideologically Divided Courts, 29 J. Legal Stud. 685, 688–89 (2000). 
338 See Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Distorting Slant in Quantitative Studies of Judging, 50 B.C. 
L. Rev. 685, 748 (2009) (quoting Cass R. Sunstein et al., Are Judges Political?: An 
Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judiciary 16 n.20 (2006)) (“As the authors ac-
knowledge, the subset of cases that are actually appealed following trial are more likely to 
have ‘a degree of indeterminacy in the law.’”). 
339 See Revesz, supra note 337, at 688–89 (“With one exception, the United States Courts 
of Appeals announce the composition of their panels only shortly before the oral argument, 
typically after all the briefs have been filed. Panels are announced 1 week before the argu-
ment in the First Circuit, on the Thursday before the argument in the Second Circuit, 10 
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 There is no effective way to be sure that there are not exogenous 
variables or selection bias issues that have distorted the results.341 This 
problem is not unique to this study, as this is a concern in virtually every 
study of federal judges.342 Nonetheless, because the Ideology Scores 
outperformed the existing measures as described in Part III, whatever 
effects that emerged from selection issues did not fully diminish the 
overall value gained by using the measure described herein. 
5. Unidimensionality 
 There is inevitably a concern when modeling judicial ideology that 
one dimension along a liberal-to-conservative continuum might be in-
sufficient to capture the nuances of the concept.343 The unidimension-
ality problem afflicts case outcome coding, external proxy measures, 
and agnostic measures.344 Although it is theoretically possible to use, for 
example, agnostic coding along multiple dimensions, the lack of 
agreement about the contents of those dimensions has inhibited such 
approaches.345 Consequently, the unidimensionality problem is a con-
cern regardless of which of the three methodologies is used.346
 The unidimensionality problem could appear in a variety of ways.347
For example, it is possible to conceive of a judge who is libertarian, dis-
trusting government in all cases and favoring individual liberty.348 This 
hypothetical judge might appear liberal in criminal cases by voting 
against the government while appearing conservative in civil cases be-
cause he or she has classically liberal economic views.349 A unidimen-
sional spectrum fails to treat such a judge any differently than one who 
days before the argument in the Third Circuit, on the day of the argument in the Fourth 
Circuit, 1 week before the argument in the Fifth Circuit, 2 weeks before the argument in the 
Sixth Circuit, on the day of the argument in the Seventh Circuit, approximately 1 month 
before the argument in the Eighth Circuit, on the Monday of the week before the argument 
in the Ninth Circuit, 1 week before the argument in the Tenth Circuit, 1 week before the 
argument in the Eleventh Circuit, and on the day of the argument in the Federal Circuit.”). 
340 See id.
341 See Priest & Klein, supra note 328, at 2. 
342 See id.
343 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 150–54. 
344 See id. at 164 (“But the agnostic approach to coding has its shortcomings as well. 
For starters, models of this type generally assume a one-dimensional spectrum, yet it may 
be difficult to know what distortions this assumption might cause.”). 
345 See Keith T. Poole, Spatial Models of Parliamentary Voting 141–47 (2005). 
346 See id.
347 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 150–54. 
348 See id.
349 See id.
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is pro-government in criminal cases, but favors government regulators 
in some civil matters. The assumption of unidimensionality can be par-
ticularly troublesome when studies examine cases over a large period of 
time.350 What constitutes “liberal” or “conservative” in 1850, 1900, 1950, 
and 2000 might vary substantially.351 So, even the one dimension identi-
fied by researchers as the basis for their study might not be static over 
time 
 Yet, there is evidence from prior studies that, in fact, a unidimen-
sional model accounts for a great deal of judicial behavior in American 
courts.352 At the U.S. Supreme Court level, a study by Professors Ber-
nard Grofman and Timothy Brazill found that a single dimension 
would predict an estimated eighty to ninety-three percent of voting by 
the Supreme Court from 1953 to 1991.353 In particular, the study found 
the unidimensional model worked especially well with more recent 
Courts.354 This should not be terribly surprising because the American 
political system is based upon two parties.355 Those parties aggregate a 
collection of policy views in contrast to the other party.356 Because the 
President appoints the judges and Senate confirms them, it follows that 
the appointed judges embody, to a large degree, the political ideology 
of the political figures that supported their nomination. It is unclear, 
however, if judges on lower courts exhibit the same degree of belief co-
hesiveness to fully disregard the unidimensionality problem.357 None-
theless, the observed high degree of correlation among various beliefs 
underlying ideology makes this worry less significant than it initially 
350 See id.
351 See id.
352 See Jacobi & Sag, supra note 21, at 17 (“[T]here is considerable evidence that a sin-
gle dimension captures the vast majority of judicial behavior. The fact that one dimension 
captures most judicial behavior does not imply that legal analysis is simplistic, only that 
most judicial considerations are generally quite highly correlated. For instance, a Justice’s 
view on breadth of congressional power is likely to be closely correlated to that Justice’s 
view on states rights and on less directly related issues, such as abortion or the death pen-
alty. Thus we can speak of a Justice being conservative or liberal, and although occasionally 
the justices surprise their audience, the majority of a Justice’s decisions are consistent with 
these expectations. In fact, Justices’ votes have been shown to be highly predictable across 
a number of issue areas including the death penalty, freedom of speech, search and sei-
zure, federalism, and administrative law.”). 
353 See Bernard Grofman & Timothy J. Brazill, Identifying the Median Justice on the Supreme 
Court Through Multidimensional Scaling: Analysis of “Natural Courts” 1953–1991, 112 Pub. 
Choice 55, 58 (2002). 
354 See id.
355 See Giles, supra note 11, at 627. 
356 See id.
357 See Jacobi & Sag, supra note 21, at 19–20. 
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might appear.358 Notably, the performance tests using civil rights cases, 
as described earlier, provide further support for using a unidimensional 
scale.359 Even when excluding every civil rights case in the data set, Ide-
ology Scores based upon the non-civil-rights cases were able to better 
predict the outcomes of civil rights cases as opposed to competing 
measures. 
Conclusion
 This study expands the metrics of judicial ideology for courts be-
low the U.S. Supreme Court to techniques based upon the behavior of 
judges. The Ideology Scores and the techniques underlying their com-
putation appear to be a significant advance over existing measures of 
the concept. In applying these scores, the results of the study were as 
follows. The eleven studied circuits exhibited very different average 
ideologies and heterogeneity of ideology. The data did not support the 
hypothesis that Presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush ap-
pointed uniquely ideological judges. Of the 177 judges studied in 2008, 
the data indicated that judges appointed by Republican presidents were 
more ideological than those appointed by Democratic presidents. No-
tably, prior government work experience and elite law school atten-
dance were strongly correlated with political liberalism on the bench. 
 There are several avenues of new research that are suggested by 
the results of this Article. First, new data sets are desperately needed for 
federal courts below the Supreme Court. Although the Songer data-
base is suitable for many projects, it is simply impossible to develop 
comprehensive measures of individual judges without greater sample 
sizes. New data also offers more opportunities to test various measures 
of judicial behavior without circularity problems. 
 Second, the techniques outlined in this Article can function just as 
well in assessing the ideology of district court judges. This study did not 
include scores for those judges primarily because of sample size con-
cerns. Nevertheless, because district courts are often the gatekeepers of 
the federal court system, it would valuable to know what their judicial 
ideologies are. 
358 See Fischman & Law, supra note 7, at 151 (“In practice, however, the challenge that 
multidimensionality poses to the measurement of judicial ideology may not be as severe as 
this hypothetical example might suggest. The views that people hold across a range of 
questions tend to correlate with one another in systematic ways.”). 
359 See supra notes 254--259 and accompanying text. 
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 Third, new multi-level, multi-court research should be performed 
to allow more and different points of comparison for assessing judicial 
behavior. By continually focusing on single courts and court levels, em-
pirical research may be overlooking crucial information about court 
interrelations. Indeed, as the research on panel composition effects 
demonstrated, the assumptions about the isolation of judicial behavior 
that existed for decades did not hold up when interactions were actu-
ally studied. 
 Ultimately, despite the numerous insights developed by empirical 
legal studies of the judiciary over the last few decades, there is substan-
tial room for the field to grow. This Article hopefully contributes to the 
direction of that growth by harnessing information from the actual ju-
dicial opinions, interactions between judicial levels, and case disposi-
tions into a single measure. Further, by focusing on courts below the 
Supreme Court, a greater picture of judicial behavior and new insights 
into members of America’s life-tenured judiciary are gained. 
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Appendix A: Judicial Ideology Scores from the most conservative to most liberal for judges with at least 
300 interactions with other judges. 
Rank Judge (Total Interactions) Circuit Common Space 
Score 
Ideology Score 
1 Rogers, John M. (366) 6 0.3920 96.4 
2 McKeague, David W. (386) 6 0.5310 91.3 
3 Batchelder, Alice M. (308) 6 0.5020 80.4 
4 O'Scannlain, Diarmuid F. (417) 9 0.0230 72.6 
5 Griffin, Richard A. (421) 6 0.5310 61.2 
6 Gruender, Raymond W. (602) 8 0.3010 56.9 
7 O'Brien, Terrence L. (345) 10 0.4405 56.1 
8 Riley, William J. (573) 8 0.2880 49.7 
9 Ikuta, Sandra S. (329) 9 0.5310 49.0 
10 Canby, William C., Jr. (320) 9 -0.1650 46.7 
11 Siler, Eugene E., Jr. (325) 6 0.3390 43.1 
12 McKeown, M. Margaret (351) 9 -0.3270 36.9 
13 Barksdale, Rhesa H. (675) 5 0.3065 36.6 
14 Niemeyer, Paul V. (674) 4 0.5020 35.5 
15 Easterbrook, Frank H. (366) 7 0.5590 35.2 
16 Murphy, Diana E. (699) 8 -0.5950 34.4 
17 Sykes, Diane S. (387) 7 0.5310 34.0 
18 Murphy, Michael R. (471) 10 -0.4220 32.1 
19 Gilman, Ronald L. (414) 6 -0.4220 29.4 
20 Garza, Emilio M. (672) 5 0.5020 27.9 
21 Bea, Carlos T. (356) 9 0.5310 27.1 
22 Rendell, Marjorie O. (336) 3 -0.4220 25.6 
23 Tjoflat, Gerald B. (883) 11 0.4090 25.2 
24 Tacha, Deanell R. (390) 10 0.2290 24.0 
25 Silverman, Barry G. (338) 9 -0.4220 23.7 
26 Gibson, John R. (318) 8 0.1380 23.2 
27 Wilkins, William W. (423) 4 0.3900 22.7 
28 Wollman, Roger L. (686) 8 0.2180 22.7 
29 Edmondson, James L. (379) 11 0.3070 22.5 
30 Bauer, William J. (390) 7 0.0340 21.8 
31 Wiener, Jacques L., Jr. (739) 5 0.5020 21.2 
32 Clifton, Richard R. (304) 9 0.5310 19.9 
33 Chagares, Michael A. (375) 3 0.5310 19.4 
34 Jones, Edith H. (438) 5 0.5020 19.0 
35 Bybee, Jay S. (352) 9 0.5310 18.8 
36 Daughtrey, Martha C. (314) 6 -0.2715 18.2 
37 Davis, W. Eugene (665) 5 0.5590 18.1 
38 Jolly, E. Grady (693) 5 0.2520 18.0 
39 Marcus, Stanley (1028) 11 -0.2340 17.2 
40 Fay, Peter T. (408) 11 0.4090 17.0 
41 Tymkovich, Timothy M. (528) 10 0.3555 16.7 
42 Briscoe, Mary B. (504) 10 -0.4220 15.9 
43 Baldock, Bobby R. (336) 10 0.2280 15.9 
44 Lucero, Carlos F. (447) 10 -0.4220 15.8 
45 Hardiman, Thomas M. (374) 3 0.0280 15.0 
46 King, Robert B. (735) 4 -0.2605 13.8 
47 Manion, Daniel A. (444) 7 0.3515 13.8 
48 Smith, Jerry E. (681) 5 0.5020 13.8 
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49 Callahan, Consuelo M. (339) 9 0.5310 13.4 
50 Flaum, Joel M. (477) 7 0.0340 12.9 
51 Shepherd, Bobby E. (618) 8 0.5310 12.2 
52 Fuentes, Julio M. (363) 3 -0.3115 11.8 
53 Posner, Richard A. (384) 7 0.0340 11.1 
54 Kelly, Paul J., Jr. (501) 10 0.2280 10.6 
55 Ebel, David M. (381) 10 0.4940 10.4 
56 Motz, Diana G. (567) 4 -0.3765 10.3 
57 Anderson, Robert L., III (1004) 11 -0.2790 10.2 
58 King, Carolyn D. (695) 5 -0.1050 10.0 
59 Southwick, Leslie (657) 5 0.3465 9.9 
60 Hall, Peter W. (443) 2 0.5310 9.2 
61 Cabranes, Jose A. (474) 2 -0.2665 9.2 
62 Prado, Edward C. (738) 5 0.3465 8.8 
63 Barkett, Rosemary (949) 11 -0.2340 8.0 
64 Reavley, Thomas M. (513) 5 -0.1050 7.9 
65 Pryor, William H., Jr. (991) 11 0.3955 7.5 
66 Shedd, Dennis W. (631) 4 0.3900 7.3 
67 Dubina, Joel F. (1020) 11 0.5020 7.3 
68 Birch, Stanley F., Jr. (1004) 11 0.5020 7.2 
69 Jordan, Kent A. (461) 3 0.5310 6.8 
70 Elrod, Jennifer W. (534) 5 0.3465 6.6 
71 Hull, Frank M. (1052) 11 -0.1910 6.4 
72 Gibbons, Julia S. (368) 6 0.3180 6.2 
73 McKee, Theodore A. (336) 3 -0.3080 6.1 
74 Black, Susan H. (1042) 11 0.3890 5.7 
75 Thomas, Sidney R. (517) 9 -0.2090 5.4 
76 Wilkinson, J. Harvie, III (474) 4 0.2335 4.8 
77 Howard, Jeffrey R. (346) 1 0.4785 4.6 
78 Livingston, Debra A. (421) 2 0.5310 4.4 
79 Hamilton, Clyde H. (494) 4 0.3900 4.0 
80 Dennis, James L. (697) 5 -0.1070 3.9 
81 Hartz, Harris L. (456) 10 0.2280 3.8 
82 Evans, Terence T. (489) 7 -0.4280 3.8 
83 Traxler, William B., Jr. (714) 4 -0.1910 3.5 
84 Clement, Edith B. (691) 5 0.5310 3.5 
85 Stewart, Carl E. (758) 5 -0.1070 3.5 
86 Carnes, Edward E. (1028) 11 0.5020 3.4 
87 Wilson, Charles R. (1112) 11 -0.2340 3.2 
88 Benton, William D. (681) 8 0.3010 3.2 
89 Ripple, Kenneth F. (414) 7 0.3515 2.6 
90 Raggi, Reena (446) 2 0.5310 2.3 
91 Colloton, Steven M. (624) 8 0.2760 2.1 
92 McKay, Monroe G. (318) 10 -0.5320 0.5 
93 Smith, Lavenski R. (635) 8 0.3630 0.0 
94 Benavides, Fortunato P. (720) 5 -0.4220 -0.3 
95 Bye, Kermit E. (576) 8 -0.2410 -0.4 
96 Sack, Robert D. (377) 2 -0.3180 -0.5 
97 Sloviter, Dolores K. (360) 3 -0.5320 -0.5 
98 Ambro, Thomas L. (402) 3 -0.3110 -0.8 
99 Roth, Jane R. (390) 3 0.2370 -0.9 
100 Fisher, Raymond C. (305) 9 -0.3380 -1.3 
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101 Katzmann, Robert A. (351) 2 -0.3195 -1.3 
102 Duncan, Allyson K. (633) 4 0.2950 -1.5 
103 Gorsuch, Neil M. (438) 10 0.5310 -1.5 
104 Jacobs, Dennis G. (336) 2 0.1350 -3.2 
105 Owen, Priscilla R. (662) 5 0.3465 -3.5 
106 Anderson, Stephen H. (333) 10 0.4095 -5.2 
107 Tashima, A. Wallace (417) 9 -0.3380 -5.5 
108 Parker, Barrington D., Jr. (371) 2 0.5310 -5.8 
109 Haynes, Catharina (339) 5 0.3465 -6.4 
110 Rovner, Ilana D. (426) 7 0.5020 -7.0 
111 Sutton, Jeffrey S. (308) 6 0.2260 -7.3 
112 Barry, Maryanne T. (386) 3 -0.3115 -7.6 
113 Higginbotham, Patrick E. (618) 5 0.4580 -8.4 
114 Gregory, Roger L. (665) 4 0.2810 -8.6 
115 Wesley, Richard C. (424) 2 0.5310 -8.7 
116 Kanne, Michael S. (420) 7 0.3515 -9.4 
117 Lipez, Kermit V. (311) 1 -0.4220 -9.5 
118 McConnell, Michael W. (453) 10 0.3100 -9.7 
119 Kravitch, Phyllis A. (382) 11 -0.0400 -11.8 
120 Holmes, Jerome A. (453) 10 0.5725 -12.4 
121 Sotomayor, Sonia (360) 2 -0.3180 -14.4 
122 Fisher, D. Michael (462) 3 0.1675 -14.6 
123 Loken, James B. (354) 8 0.1235 -16.4 
124 Lynch, Sandra L. (356) 1 -0.3995 -17.0 
125 Martin, Boyce F., Jr. (339) 6 -0.2270 -17.4 
126 Williams, Ann C. (384) 7 -0.3450 -18.1 
127 Fletcher, Betty B. (647) 9 -0.3400 -19.7 
128 Cole, Ransey G., Jr. (417) 6 -0.2670 -20.5 
129 Torruella, Juan R. (343) 1 0.5590 -22.4 
130 Melloy, Michael J. (453) 8 0.2760 -23.2 
131 Pooler, Rosemary S. (357) 2 -0.3180 -24.3 
132 Wood, Diane P. (423) 7 -0.3795 -24.9 
133 Smith, Norman R. (431) 9 0.4100 -27.8 
134 Smith, David B. (375) 3 0.1675 -29.0 
135 Paez, Richard A. (416) 9 -0.3380 -29.1 
136 Nelson, Dorothy W. (335) 9 -0.4090 -32.2 
137 Gould, Ronald M. (329) 9 -0.3270 -34.1 
138 Clay, Eric L. (387) 6 -0.3680 -34.4 
139 Michael, M. Blane (647) 4 -0.2605 -37.4 
140 Moore, Karen N. (465) 6 -0.2670 -37.7 
141 Hawkins, Michael D. (346) 9 -0.1650 -38.4 
142 Wardlaw, Kim M. (387) 9 -0.3380 -41.7 
143 Graber, Susan (356) 9 -0.2920 -66.7 
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77 Howard, Jeffrey R. (346) 1 0.4785 4.6 
117 Lipez, Kermit V. (311) 1 -0.422 -9.5 
124 Lynch, Sandra L. (356) 1 -0.3995 -17.0 
129 Torruella, Juan R. (343) 1 0.559 -22.4 
61 Cabranes, Jose A. (474) 2 -0.2665 9.2 
60 Hall, Peter W. (443) 2 0.531 9.2 
104 Jacobs, Dennis G. (336) 2 0.135 -3.2 
101 Katzmann, Robert A. (351) 2 -0.3195 -1.3 
78 Livingston, Debra A. (421) 2 0.531 4.4 
108 Parker, Barrington D., Jr. (371) 2 0.531 -5.8 
131 Pooler, Rosemary S. (357) 2 -0.318 -24.3 
90 Raggi, Reena (446) 2 0.531 2.3 
96 Sack, Robert D. (377) 2 -0.318 -0.5 
121 Sotomayor, Sonia (360) 2 -0.318 -14.4 
115 Wesley, Richard C. (424) 2 0.531 -8.7 
98 Ambro, Thomas L. (402) 3 -0.311 -0.8 
112 Barry, Maryanne T. (386) 3 -0.3115 -7.6 
33 Chagares, Michael A. (375) 3 0.531 19.4 
122 Fisher, D. Michael (462) 3 0.1675 -14.6 
52 Fuentes, Julio M. (363) 3 -0.3115 11.8 
45 Hardiman, Thomas M. (374) 3 0.028 15.0 
69 Jordan, Kent A. (461) 3 0.531 6.8 
73 McKee, Theodore A. (336) 3 -0.308 6.1 
22 Rendell, Marjorie O. (336) 3 -0.422 25.6 
99 Roth, Jane R. (390) 3 0.237 -0.9 
97 Sloviter, Dolores K. (360) 3 -0.532 -0.5 
134 Smith, David B. (375) 3 0.1675 -29.0 
102 Duncan, Allyson K. (633) 4 0.295 -1.5 
114 Gregory, Roger L. (665) 4 0.281 -8.6 
79 Hamilton, Clyde H. (494) 4 0.39 4.0 
46 King, Robert B. (735) 4 -0.2605 13.8 
139 Michael, M. Blane (647) 4 -0.2605 -37.4 
56 Motz, Diana G. (567) 4 -0.3765 10.3 
14 Niemeyer, Paul V. (674) 4 0.502 35.5 
66 Shedd, Dennis W. (631) 4 0.39 7.3 
83 Traxler, William B., Jr. (714) 4 -0.191 3.5 
27 Wilkins, William W. (423) 4 0.39 22.7 
76 Wilkinson, J. Harvie, III (474) 4 0.2335 4.8 
13 Barksdale, Rhesa H. (675) 5 0.3065 36.6 
94 Benavides, Fortunato P. (720) 5 -0.422 -0.3 
84 Clement, Edith B. (691) 5 0.531 3.5 
37 Davis, W. Eugene (665) 5 0.559 18.1 
80 Dennis, James L. (697) 5 -0.107 3.9 
70 Elrod, Jennifer W. (534) 5 0.3465 6.6 
20 Garza, Emilio M. (672) 5 0.502 27.9 
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109 Haynes, Catharina (339) 5 0.3465 -6.4 
113 Higginbotham, Patrick E. (618) 5 0.458 -8.4 
38 Jolly, E. Grady (693) 5 0.252 18.0 
34 Jones, Edith H. (438) 5 0.502 19.0 
58 King, Carolyn D. (695) 5 -0.105 10.0 
105 Owen, Priscilla R. (662) 5 0.3465 -3.5 
62 Prado, Edward C. (738) 5 0.3465 8.8 
64 Reavley, Thomas M. (513) 5 -0.105 7.9 
48 Smith, Jerry E. (681) 5 0.502 13.8 
59 Southwick, Leslie (657) 5 0.3465 9.9 
85 Stewart, Carl E. (758) 5 -0.107 3.5 
31 Wiener, Jacques L., Jr. (739) 5 0.502 21.2 
3 Batchelder, Alice M. (308) 6 0.502 80.4 
138 Clay, Eric L. (387) 6 -0.368 -34.4 
128 Cole, Ransey G., Jr. (417) 6 -0.267 -20.5 
36 Daughtrey, Martha C. (314) 6 -0.2715 18.2 
72 Gibbons, Julia S. (368) 6 0.318 6.2 
19 Gilman, Ronald L. (414) 6 -0.422 29.4 
5 Griffin, Richard A. (421) 6 0.531 61.2 
125 Martin, Boyce F., Jr. (339) 6 -0.227 -17.4 
2 McKeague, David W. (386) 6 0.531 91.3 
140 Moore, Karen N. (465) 6 -0.267 -37.7 
1 Rogers, John M. (366) 6 0.392 96.4 
11 Siler, Eugene E., Jr. (325) 6 0.339 43.1 
111 Sutton, Jeffrey S. (308) 6 0.226 -7.3 
30 Bauer, William J. (390) 7 0.034 21.8 
15 Easterbrook, Frank H. (366) 7 0.559 35.2 
82 Evans, Terence T. (489) 7 -0.428 3.8 
50 Flaum, Joel M. (477) 7 0.034 12.9 
116 Kanne, Michael S. (420) 7 0.3515 -9.4 
47 Manion, Daniel A. (444) 7 0.3515 13.8 
53 Posner, Richard A. (384) 7 0.034 11.1 
89 Ripple, Kenneth F. (414) 7 0.3515 2.6 
110 Rovner, Ilana D. (426) 7 0.502 -7.0 
17 Sykes, Diane S. (387) 7 0.531 34.0 
126 Williams, Ann C. (384) 7 -0.345 -18.1 
132 Wood, Diane P. (423) 7 -0.3795 -24.9 
88 Benton, William D. (681) 8 0.301 3.2 
95 Bye, Kermit E. (576) 8 -0.241 -0.4 
91 Colloton, Steven M. (624) 8 0.276 2.1 
26 Gibson, John R. (318) 8 0.138 23.2 
6 Gruender, Raymond W. (602) 8 0.301 56.9 
123 Loken, James B. (354) 8 0.1235 -16.4 
130 Melloy, Michael J. (453) 8 0.276 -23.2 
16 Murphy, Diana E. (699) 8 -0.595 34.4 
8 Riley, William J. (573) 8 0.288 49.7 
51 Shepherd, Bobby E. (618) 8 0.531 12.2 
93 Smith, Lavenski R. (635) 8 0.363 0.0 
28 Wollman, Roger L. (686) 8 0.218 22.7 
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21 Bea, Carlos T. (356) 9 0.531 27.1 
35 Bybee, Jay S. (352) 9 0.531 18.8 
49 Callahan, Consuelo M. (339) 9 0.531 13.4 
10 Canby, William C., Jr. (320) 9 -0.165 46.7 
32 Clifton, Richard R. (304) 9 0.531 19.9 
100 Fisher, Raymond C. (305) 9 -0.338 -1.3 
127 Fletcher, Betty B. (647) 9 -0.34 -19.7 
137 Gould, Ronald M. (329) 9 -0.327 -34.1 
143 Graber, Susan (356) 9 -0.292 -66.7 
141 Hawkins, Michael D. (346) 9 -0.165 -38.4 
9 Ikuta, Sandra S. (329) 9 0.531 49.0 
12 McKeown, M. Margaret (351) 9 -0.327 36.9 
136 Nelson, Dorothy W. (335) 9 -0.409 -32.2 
4 O'Scannlain, Diarmuid F. (417) 9 0.023 72.6 
135 Paez, Richard A. (416) 9 -0.338 -29.1 
25 Silverman, Barry G. (338) 9 -0.422 23.7 
133 Smith, Norman R. (431) 9 0.41 -27.8 
107 Tashima, A. Wallace (417) 9 -0.338 -5.5 
75 Thomas, Sidney R. (517) 9 -0.209 5.4 
142 Wardlaw, Kim M. (387) 9 -0.338 -41.7 
106 Anderson, Stephen H. (333) 10 0.4095 -5.2 
43 Baldock, Bobby R. (336) 10 0.228 15.9 
42 Briscoe, Mary B. (504) 10 -0.422 15.9 
55 Ebel, David M. (381) 10 0.494 10.4 
103 Gorsuch, Neil M. (438) 10 0.531 -1.5 
81 Hartz, Harris L. (456) 10 0.228 3.8 
120 Holmes, Jerome A. (453) 10 0.5725 -12.4 
54 Kelly, Paul J., Jr. (501) 10 0.228 10.6 
44 Lucero, Carlos F. (447) 10 -0.422 15.8 
118 McConnell, Michael W. (453) 10 0.31 -9.7 
92 McKay, Monroe G. (318) 10 -0.532 0.5 
18 Murphy, Michael R. (471) 10 -0.422 32.1 
7 O'Brien, Terrence L. (345) 10 0.4405 56.1 
24 Tacha, Deanell R. (390) 10 0.229 24.0 
41 Tymkovich, Timothy M. (528) 10 0.3555 16.7 
57 Anderson, Robert L., III (1004) 11 -0.279 10.2 
63 Barkett, Rosemary (949) 11 -0.234 8.0 
68 Birch, Stanley F., Jr. (1004) 11 0.502 7.2 
74 Black, Susan H. (1042) 11 0.389 5.7 
86 Carnes, Edward E. (1028) 11 0.502 3.4 
67 Dubina, Joel F. (1020) 11 0.502 7.3 
29 Edmondson, James L. (379) 11 0.307 22.5 
40 Fay, Peter T. (408) 11 0.409 17.0 
71 Hull, Frank M. (1052) 11 -0.191 6.4 
119 Kravitch, Phyllis A. (382) 11 -0.04 -11.8 
39 Marcus, Stanley (1028) 11 -0.234 17.2 
65 Pryor, William H., Jr. (991) 11 0.3955 7.5 
23 Tjoflat, Gerald B. (883) 11 0.409 25.2 
87 Wilson, Charles R. (1112) 11 -0.234 3.2 
